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ABSTRACT

NAVIGATING THE INTERIM
MAY 2015
JOE SAPHIRE, B.F.A., COLLEGE NAME
M.F.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Susan Jahoda
Navigating the Interim attempts to build a framework for the ways in which visual art,
media studies, and forms of social practice might intermingle within a career in the arts,
as well as within a thorough art education curriculum. From broad theoretical analysis to
the specificity of technical exercises and prompts, this paper serves as a roadmap for the
ways in which production, teaching, and organizing might begin to merge into a single
holistic practice. The author’s projects provide an anchor from which to analyze the
various conceptual trajectories of art that have stemmed from modernism throughout the
20th century, as well as to challenge the anti-aesthetic phenomenon that has emerged out
of this evolution, which has influenced paradigms within art education and leads to an
analysis of the author’s own creative impulses, such as media activism, noise-based and
appropriative tactics, and concerns about Debordian Spectacle. These self-analyses and
reflections are situated within various binary oppositions: object-action, opacitytransparency, deconstruction-enstrangement, replacement-extension, and staticprogressive.
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CHAPTER 1
FRAMEWORK

Introduction
What is this interim and why does it need navigating? Or is the interim—the liminal—
rather by definition a constant state of navigation, conscious or not? This interim—this
being in between—and its implication of expectant resolution (or at least progression) is
at the core of my work in ways that are both specific and abstract, practical and
philosophical. Navigating the Interim is a framework that informs three basic elements:
the nature of my studio work; the relationships between various artistic and professional
practices that I employ; and the specific organizational structure of this paper, which
situates my work between various theoretical binary oppositions relevant to my practice.
This framework will consider the historical foundation for my work, address the various
methods and content of my studio practice, and lay out the potential practical and
professional applications for my work moving forward.

Studio Work1
The interim speaks to a cultural state of media saturation: everywhere we turn in the
Western world we find meaning-making narratives and information fragments that must
be organized, parsed out, understood, and responded to. We hold these meanings,
whether culturally constructed or individually interpreted, in our minds at all times. We

1

For the purposes of this paper I will refer to work of which I consider myself the primary author as
“studio work” or “studio practice” in order to differentiate it from other practices I will address that are
more ambiguous in their authored output, such as teaching, collaborating, and organizing.
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check our selves, identities, judgments, priorities, and worldviews against what we see
and hear transmitted through a ubiquitous and persistent flow of information.
The interim is navigated in my studio work through non-linear and experimental
video, immersive and interventionist installation, appropriative and noise-based tactics,
and strategies that aim to extend cultural content in order to repurpose its forms, diffuse
intended meanings, and construct new dialogical uses. This stems from an interest in
Debordian spectacle, within which I would argue the individual is in a constant state of
flux between active and passive reception.
Debord’s analyses and the following decades of art and theoretical work it spurred
seem to position the cultural condition of spectacle as conspiratorial. I argue, rather, it
might be more productive to consider it a phenomenon of human nature—not a rational,
centralized system of control, but an irrational scatter of impulses and desires, enabled by
a capitalist structure that relies on irrationality2. Through this randomized scatter—and
the collective compliance with “universal separation” over “unification” that results—we
come to prefer the sign to the signified (Debord 5).
One might begin to claim personal responsibility for the effects of active-passive
spectatorship by identifying the elements of spectacle that are so seductive. My studio
work attempts to embrace this broad condition of spectacle—accepts it as a naturally
2

This assertion is based on observation of, and participation in, a consumer economy in which products
and services must be purchased by the consumer to sustain the health of the economy, and therefore
desire for these products and services must be in some way manufactured in order to create competition
and maintain the cycle of production-consumption. I am considering this cycle irrational in respect to
its reliance on impulse and immediacy, in that the consumer must not look too far past the patina of
need and find the reality of desire. For example, in a recession, consumers are thought to have tightened
their belts and saved their money rather than spent. The economy suffers from what might be
considered the consumer’s rational turn. This paper will occasionally use the above description of
consumerism, albeit overly simplistic, in relation to analyses of spectacle, 20th century modernism, and
social practice.
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occurring phenomenon, rather than simply a style of expression that one can ignore as a
matter of taste—in order to gradually dissolve its formulaic structures and pacifying
effects. It attempts to co-opt common modes of spectacle and misuse3 its forms. Misuse,
therefore, becomes a tactic of intervention into the intended narratives of spectacle.
I am interested in the immediate recognition of, and association with, culturally
ubiquitous imagery and narrative tactics: the seamless editing tricks of popular film, the
formulaic production of a baseball game, the seductive narrative of a 30-second
advertisement, the spectatorial distance of devastating news footage. I am interested in
the psychological toggle between submission and analysis, association and dismissal, in
which our culture engages with each passing image.
Our overwhelming taste for these ubiquitous images and narrative tactics betrays
a cultural preference for—and desire for—content to follow the path, or narrative, of least
resistance. We prefer transparency of media—to get lost in the story—rather than the
media opacity4 that consumer criticality, or producer imprecision, might bring about. Is
this preference a symptom of the passivity that spectatorship requires, or is it rather
broadly human nature to desire clarity of meaning and progressive narrative structure? As
3

My interpretation of the word misuse stems from an essay by D. Graham Burnett, professor of History of
Science at Princeton University. Burnett positions Henry David Thoreau’s interest in the telegraph harp
(as Thoreau refers to it in his Journals) within the context of information theory and noise culture.
Burnett’s analysis will be addressed in a later section of this paper on “Noise.”

4

This binary, transparency-opacity, relates to information theory and cultural studies differently than art.
For instance, an opaque medium in art (particularly an art form, like one of mine, that attempts to
address, or convey, this very argument as critical content) will distract from the very criticality the artist
is attempting to bring about. Might it be argued that, if the intention is to activate criticality rather than
preserve passivity (no matter the banality or severity of content), then opacity is a detriment? Therefore,
in the realm of information theory and cultural studies, is transparency a detriment to understanding the
apparatus—the medium? Is this exception for art a kind of moralism and therefore irrelevant to the
analysis of the binary? Is intention even possible to identify? These definitions, concerns, and questions
regarding transparency-opacity will be considered in the “Methods” section.
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a consumer of spectacles, a cultural producer, and general participant in the dense forest
of cultural images, meanings, associations, and products, I accept my own precarious
toggle between absorption and repulsion, submission and criticality, passivity and
activity. My studio work attempts to commiserate, to empathize, and to grasp for some
semblance of control over the spectacular scatter of narratives, meanings, and personal
associations. It both critiques and embodies, resists and embraces, the perpetual flow of
media culture. It attempts to navigate the interim.

Binaries
The various binary frames that emerge in this paper are simplistic, and certainly
reductive, but extremely useful as writing tactics to contain relevant theoretical debates
that inform my work. They are designed as both catalysts for discussion and tactics to
situate my own practice within the vague interim between the poles. When Brian Eno 5
describes, for instance, “moving the process of making music much closer to the process
of painting,” he considers the potential for musical composition and reception to be
thought of as static, as opposed to progressive, and is therefore calling into question the
narrative tendencies of the western classical tradition (“Ambient Music” 95). This binary
aids in analyzing cultural tendencies toward linear narrative. The cultural motivations
behind appropriation tactics are considered more expansively when analyzed through the
framework of extending versus replacing. This binary opposition implies a wealth of
concerns regarding the function of appropriation in a spectatorial culture. Through
appropriation tactics, do we aim to extend, embrace, and repurpose ubiquitous cultural
5

Eno is of particular importance to this paper for his many contributions to experimental composition and
minimalist music. His work will be discussed in later sections for his directorial approach to authorship.
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forms, or do we rather aim to replace, resist, and reject them? The binary opposition
provides a rich foundation from which to consider appropriation, where the complex
degrees of making, orchestrating, repurposing, juxtaposing, referencing, and
recontextualizing can be parsed out and explored.

Between the Practices
This paper addresses tangible and applicable outputs for the ways in which my
production, collaboration, organizing, design, and teaching intersect. Ultimately, I am
seeking to balance the impulse to produce and the desire to create venues for active
dialogue.
My gravitation toward teaching stems from the same dialogical motivation that
drives my studio, collaborative, and event-based practices. Art-making is a
communicative process, and inherently social. It is a negotiation between intention and
meaning, technique and experimentation, maker and viewer. It is a living thing, out in the
world, increasingly more an ephemeral action than static product. It is my aim that
students leave my instruction feeling empowered to apply their experience to various
endeavors, that they might invent new audiences, venues, and functionalities as creative
entrepreneurs.
Teaching in this way forces me to hold my own work up to the same standards of
invention. What might it mean for my studio work to apply to, or be adapted for, various
constituencies, platforms, and audiences? That my studio work is rarely object-based and
not easily commodifiable is an opportunity to align art-making with orchestration or
direction: the framing of conditions for artistic encounters. In this way, forms follow
concepts, which manifest as various iterations, versions, and situations. An authored
5

video work might, for instance, be translated into an assignment prompt for high school
students; a site-specific installation might require the expertise of a sculptor, or
participation of a performer, to be resolved in its strongest form; an old art product might
be considered material for a new one, which in turn might be material for the next. Form,
therefore, is a necessary container for the situation of an idea, which is free to be
recontextualized and transmitted in various ways. Technical craft, aesthetic form, and
conceptual inclinations might have meta-lives—meta-functions—in the service of greater
outputs and products.
This freeing of concepts from the rigidity of singular form, true of so many other
disciplines and fields outside of the arts, opens the artist up to a collective reservoir of
skill sets, devices, and applications. Ralph Waldo Emerson writes in his essay “Quotation
and Originality,” “What you owe to me—you will vary the phrase—but I shall still
recognize my thought. But what you say from the same idea, will have to me also the
expected unexpectedness which belongs to every new work of Nature”6 (qtd. in Oswald
132). There is in this quote a confidence in thought and trust in the collective receiver to
transmit it—translate it—through the nuanced originality of the situation and myriad
conditions of form. The thought—or concept, idea, creative inclination—is a gift. To
develop, test, nurture, and gradually form a concept is a skill, just as is technical mastery
and craft of execution. Seen through this lens, it might be considered counterproductive,
even egocentric, for a single artist to master (or at least seek mastery of) all facets of the
art-making process. Collaboration, in this way, might be considered a regular and

6

I originally came across this quote by Emerson in an essay by John Oswald titled, “Bettered by the
Borrower: The Ethics of Musical Debt.” I will address Oswald’s essay, as well as his Plunderphonics
sound pieces, in later sections.
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necessary occurrence, whether as abstract as a maker who collaborates with an
established industry for the manufacture of his or her tools, or as literal as a collective
that shares all resources. Collaborate, so as not to reinvent the wheel.
Could collaboration even, then, be considered a redundant term, as art products
and the cultural functions of artists begin to disperse into the broader cultural landscape?
Might revisiting this notion of collaboration refine and complicate our understanding of
authorship? A filmmaker, after all, while certainly revered as a sort of authority, is not,
however, considered the sole author of his or her product. Rather, a kind of collaboration
is implied. While a research scientist might be considered a sort of author of a new
development in his or her area of specialization, the work is understood to be based on a
reservoir of previous work by other people, as well as the direct result of a supportive
institution, granting agent, and staff of assistants, colleagues, and participants; in this
case, as well, collaboration is implied. Might a cultural complication (and public debate)
of authorship and collaboration begin to bring the economics of artistic production more
in line with collectivism than capitalistic individuality? Within this increasingly shared
cultural climate, such a debate might gradually lead to more sustainable positions for
artists, both professionally and economically, as we begin to parse out the complexity and
precarity of the broad cultural production industry.
I am interested in aligning creative practices within the visual arts with, for
instance, music, where, as in the examples above, collaboration is more closely tethered
to the existence of the product in the first place—where it is implied as a necessary means
of production and reception. This interest, which positions collaborating as well as
teaching as a practice of negotiation, is best exemplified by the project PlayLaborPlay, a
series of art events that emerge out of collaborations with local artists, musicians, writers,
7

or anyone with a compelling idea. Events are designed to emphasize balance between
content and venue, often situated in unlikely places, like pop-up shows. From a cultural
perspective, this project situates the reception of art more as music is received—more as
ephemera to be experienced than as objects to be revered. It attempts to exemplify the
ways in which art can be local, sustainable, critical, accessible, and dialogical—a
culturally integrated, relational art experience. PlayLaborPlay is also a model for what
one day could be an organization or production studio: a sustainable structure for
teaching workshops, designing events, and producing works that revolve around the
confluence of media education and art. Such an organization is a potentially practical
application for my work moving forward, and will be explored further in the concluding
“Application” chapter.
Aside from alternative organizational structures, such as PlayLaborPlay, there
might also be other alternative, sustainable, and immersive formats and outputs worth
exploring. Blogs, archives, and other Web-based venues might find greater, more varied
audiences for my work than galleries and group exhibitions. Content that takes the form
of public interventions or presentations might further explore fluidity of form and the
potential virtues of artistic outputs that are encountered versus expected7. Doors might be
further opened in the future by designing or pursuing projects I contribute to, direct, or
help to produce, as opposed to exclusively author.
Much of the theoretical background for the above concerns regarding
relationships between practices relies on Nicolas Bourriaud’s notion of “relational
aesthetics.” Bourriaud’s theory, laid out in two essays, “Relational Aesthetics” and
7

This binary, encountered-expected, will be considered in this paper in relation to interventionist tactics
(“Methods”), as well as in the concluding “Application” section regarding the exhibition component to
this thesis, titled The Waiting Room.
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Postproduction, serves as a frame through which to sustainably create non-object-based
works, and explores the ways in which artists draw from “a catalog of forms”
(Postproduction 8). Relational aesthetics will be considered along with Claire Bishop’s
analyses, in Artificial Hells, of the politics of authorship, collaboration, and immaterial
aesthetics within the context of participatory art and social practice, in order to offer a
picture of the current theoretical predicament of my work moving forward.

9

CHAPTER 2
REFLECTION

Introduction
The job of the artist is a tenuous one. If it can be called a job, it might be the most
unstable, historically shifting, culturally disagreed upon (or maybe culturally
misunderstood) social position. Artists must situate themselves within a dense historical
framework—a history already rife with interpretation, exclusion, and self-referentiality—
and at the same time actively find audiences that can, and will, access their crafts,
concepts, definitions of, and approaches to art-making. Audiences, therefore, validate the
work and satisfy the fact that art-making is a form of communication and societal
reflection and therefore must be an attempt to convey something to someone.
William Deresiewicz in The Atlantic eloquently describes the evolving societal
designation of the artist over the last four centuries as moving from artisan, to genius, to
professional, to entrepreneur. He provides a lucid analysis of this trajectory in his article
“The Death of the Artist—and the Birth of the Creative Entrepreneur.” There is
simultaneously something grim and liberating about Deresiewicz’s analysis.
To briefly synthesize his distinctions, the artisan, prior to the late 18th century,
was a craftsman—one who developed a set of skills under the advisement of
apprenticeships to eventually, at its highest echelon, become a master. The high meaning
of “Art,” as it were, had not been invented yet. The age of Romanticism in the late 18th,
early 19th centuries, brought about the genius. The individualism, revolution, and
secularization of this period manifested in artists who threw off the shackles of tradition
and paved their own unique way. “As traditional belief became discredited,” Deresiewicz
10

states, “the arts emerged as the basis of a new creed, the place where people turned to put
themselves in touch with higher truths.” Fine Arts emerge, the solitary genius the new
purveyor of spirituality. Modernist individualism emerges late in this period and carries
the academy through the middle of the 20th century (further, truthfully, albeit more
subtly, into present time, a judgment that I will come back to). Overlapping throughout
the 20th century, Deresiewicz argues, is the distinction of the artist as a professional. This
is the age of institutionalization. Postwar America, and the age of American world power,
influences the arts in the form of support and glorification, and leads to what Deresiewicz
calls “an entire bureaucratic apparatus” within which the artist is gradually assimilated
and institutionalized. This is the age of MFAs, residencies, artist grants, and academic
positions. Finally, Deresiewicz calls the current predicament of the artist, following the
viable and at least marginally supported distinction of the professional, that of the
entrepreneur. This distinction, Deresiewicz argues, is marked by “the removal of the last
vestiges of protection and mediation” that the market afforded the previous professional
distinction of the artist. The artist is now maker, producer, financier, technician,
promoter, salesman, and educator for his or her practice. While this argument is not
absolute—there are still available positions in higher education institutions, forms of
direct patronage, and collective systems within which to operate—opportunities for
artistic practices to be self-sustained are shrinking, changing, or are at least in a state of
extreme flux.
I accept this designation. For better or worse, Deresiewicz’s analysis rings true.
As a creative entrepreneur, I am concerned with the job of the artist, the ways in which
practices might be sustained, and must take this tectonic shift of societal role as an
opportunity to carve new niches and expansive definitions within the arts. I will begin to
11

situate my practice through my own historical analysis by considering the state of art
education, with particular attention to the high school level and younger. After all, our
cultural attitudes towards art are shaped early on, which affects not only the size of the
future artist pool, but also the level of seriousness and support it is awarded by future
generations.

An Outdated Paradigm
Although Deresiewicz’s genius paradigm (which from now on I will refer to as modernist
individualism) was outdated within the institutional art world by the mid-20th century, it
lingers even today in our schools. Children develop the judgment at an early age that
representational drawing, for instance, is a gift that some magically possess and others
don’t. It is not a skill to be nurtured, but rather a fact of one’s nature. This is a sad truth of
art education. It is not to say, however, that everyone is an artist, or that drawing is an
unnecessary skill, but only that our culture, by privileging representational image-making
as the basic sign of artistry, eliminates a huge number of young people for whom simply
shifting the focus might open a world of communicative options; truly, even those
students who have a knack for drawing would be better prepared for the road ahead with
a simple shift of emphasis.
This is also not to say that it is the fault of schools and teachers. While of course
they play a part, it is the culture at large that perpetuates this privilege. For someone only
tacitly interested in the arts, it is understandable that the assumed role of the artist is to
produce consumable products made to supplement given environments, products which
carry in their content some kind of mystery to be appreciated or contemplated. The artist,
in this case, to follow Deresiewicz’s logic, is purveyor of spirituality, and the consumer is
12

free to consume whichever type of spiritual remove is best suited. There is nothing
inherently wrong with this kind of tacit relationship to the arts, only that it is increasingly
at odds with the actual societal application of the arts today. Students will be much better
prepared for a life in the arts—one that is entrepreneurial, shape-shifting, dialogical, and
broadly adaptable—if they are learning to communicate through their technical skills and
artistic endeavors, rather than merely executing them as established form.
Where should this focus be shifted? Although the shift would manifest in various
ways depending on the particular situation, in a general sense the focus should shift from
object to action. Art, at least at introductory levels of instruction, should be considered in
its verb form: something we do, versus something we make. This is not to say that any
technical skill or traditional practice should be eliminated, only that its position in
curriculum should be shifted from universal foundation to dialogical tool. To clarify, all
forms of art and technique should be held up to the same standards of effective
communication and situational relevance. If art is a form of communication, then each
artwork is a signpost, which sends the viewer to some other concept, idea, or
psychological condition. So where is the viewer being sent? Students are capable of
grappling with this question even at a young age. This shift places emphasis on choices
(conceptual, technical, or aesthetic), intentions, and discourse: a dialogical, versus
spectatorial, emphasis in art education .Spectatorial, in this case, is akin to a kind of
viewing closer to the immediacy of entertainment than the subtlety of education, the
expectation of awe.
Such a shift would pose problems for schools, which I would argue stems from a
need to educate families and communities at large. Art programs must, after all, regularly
validate their existence to funding bodies, school boards, and parent communities. The
13

spectatorial mode of reception is still assumed as the norm for this audience and the work
of students must live up to a certain standard of production. Consider this example: a
drawing exercise that might open the minds of students about principles of visual
perception, and lead to a wealth of connections between psychology, optics, and
philosophy, might also look uninteresting (or at least incomplete) on the wall of a high
school hallway. The products of the exercise might not be immediately impressive or
visually striking. The application of this exercise, however—this mind-expanding act of
putting pencil to paper and, with care and attention, producing an illusion—might yield a
more unique, holistic, innovative creative voice.

An Amended Paradigm
While the residue of modernist individualism, particularly within the culture at large, has
a negative influence on the current state of art education, I do not believe it should be
wholly replaced. This is not a call for some kind of revolution, which would attempt (and
fail) to leave so much history in the dust 8. Rather, below is a practical, albeit broad,
framework for amending the ways in which traditional skills are categorized and taught,
which might gradually move art education, and our larger cultural attitudes, toward a
more applicable definition of the artist. I have delineated these skill and concept
categories as sight, space, style, and time.
Introductory-level art students are in the process of developing an awareness of
visual space. They are learning that they can translate their experience through various
media and methods, and are beginning to shape a creative voice. Drawing, therefore, is
8

Later in this section I will discuss the arguably radical tendencies of certain forms of social practice in
relation to the Modern individualist paradigm and the institutionalization of social practice.
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not merely the act of rendering something on paper, but rather an opportunity for students
to look closely at their environment and learn the ways in which their eyes interpret
space; they learn to see. Students might be asked to reflect on their creative action: Are
you drawing with your eyes or your mind? Traditional drawing, or drafting, is essentially
learning to translate 3-dimensional experience into 2-dimensional form, and as students
work on a landscape or a still life, they gradually trust their eyes and draw what they see.
Sculpture, therefore, is not merely the process of making an object, but rather
interpreting, utilizing, and manipulating space. To emphasize creative action over static
product, students might be asked: How does your structure interact with the space it’s in?
How is the viewer confronted with the idea your project represents in an environment?
How will it ultimately live?
Painting, because the hand of the artist is so necessarily present, might be
positioned as a traditional skill that emphasizes personal voice and style. It is an
opportunity to analyze and manipulate the ways in which our minds interpret color,
shape, and composition. Though introductory-level students might still be instructed to
paint what they see in order to understand the relationships between color, shape, and
perception, they are also able to bend their visual reality, to deviate from it in the interest
of their ideas and concepts.
To synthesize, traditional art education cultivates awareness of visual experience
through learning to see, interpreting and interacting with physical space, and
manipulating visual experience in pursuit of a creative voice. Basic elements can be
summed up as sight, space, and style. This is not an argument for a change in traditional
education—the above distinctions are nothing new—but rather a shift in emphasis, in that

15

each skill is a conduit to a more dialogical, applicable relationship, as opposed to a selfcontained, or self-referential, institutional foundation.
An integral element that is often missing from introductory-level curriculum,
however, is time or duration. Time-based media such as video, animation, performance,
audio, and to some extent, installation are missing from traditional art education, at least
at the introductory level. Although facilitating time-based projects in studio and introlevel courses is often technically impossible on account of facilities, the topic of duration
must still be addressed in order to prepare students for the broad range of applications at
the following levels and in the larger cultural context. This is not to say students must
learn how to make videos as an isolated technical skill any more than they must learn to
paint in isolation. It is simply to say that the technical and conceptual element of time
must be brought into the discussion. If not addressed specifically through time-based
media, the element of time can be related to, for instance, space in the context of
performance, ephemerality, or site-specificity: simple emphasis on the conditions of time
as factors in the reception, lifespan, and conceptual intentions of a work.9
To amend the focus of traditional art education and shift emphasis from product
to action—noun to verb—is a way to gradually neutralize the modernist individualist
tendencies of art education and our cultural perceptions of art. To absorb the discrete
product into the continuity of practice, to emphasize versatility over technical mastery, to
be resourceful enough to adapt to various formal needs: these are tenets that might help to
gradually shape new cultural attitudes toward the job of the artist.

9

For tactical examples of this association of the element of time with space for introductory-level
instruction, see my essay “Media Art in Traditional Introductory Arts Practices,” written as part of a
Media Arts curriculum guide for the Kingswood Oxford School.
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Forms and Concepts
A brief historical analysis will help establish what I judge to be the artistic departures
from modernist individualism throughout the 20th century in order to situate my studio
practice in a historical context, as well as to better understand the effects of modernist
residue on cultural attitudes towards the societal role of the artist. While projects like
PlayLaborPlay attempt to neutralize culturally embedded modernist individualism
through tactics of collaboration and intervention and by emphasizing ephemerality over
fixed products, I am more concerned here with decidedly studio-based practices, and the
ways in which they have evolved since the early 1900s.
What else is motivating this analysis? I want the practice of art to be culturally
integrated—rather than an increasingly academic, insular pursuit—just as accessible in its
myriad conceptual iterations and intentions as in its aesthetic forms and technical
traditions. I want my grandma to connect with, understand, and appreciate my
experimental video work as much as she does my representational painting of my brother.
I will begin with abstract painting and relate it to the evolution of conceptualism
throughout the 20th century. I will consider this period, for at least the purposes of this
paper, the beginning of an era of artists devaluing the art object, which carries particular
significance in a market-driven, consumer-based paradigm that still informs cultural
attitudes towards the arts. This discussion relies heavily on “Abstraction, 1910-1925:
Eight Statements,” a selection of eight short essays published in the journal October in
response to the Museum of Modern Art, New York, 2012-13 exhibition Inventing
Abstraction, 1910-1925. I will use a few of these essays as frameworks for my
observations and analyses.
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The overly simplistic, narrowly binary, Greenbergian argument for abstraction as
“in opposition to realism,” as laid out by Leah Dickerman in the introductory essay for
“Eight Statements,” is complicated by decades of postmodern pastiche, technological and
mass media saturation, and the relatively formless (or rather form de-emphasizing)
contributions of conceptualism, relational aesthetics, participatory art, and social practice.
The modernist search for a medium’s “effects exclusive to itself” did much to move the
practice of art away from unchecked referentiality, but also left it in a cycle of selfreference that, over time, would prove to be untenable and irrelevant to the constructive
functioning of art in society, to its societal applicability (3-4). Concern only for effects
exclusive to itself might be viewed as escapism, the implied purity of the insular studio
rising above the travesties of war and human devastation outside.
But this reversion from representation, and abstraction’s self-criticality, truly
opened the door to conceptual thinking and the unfolding of artistic practice into an
exploration of process and artistic action. The four models for abstraction put forth by
Yve-Alain Bois in his essay for “Eight Statements” are extremely useful for this
discussion (7-17). I will briefly sum them up in order to focus particular attention on the
last.
The first model for abstraction, arbitrariness, speaks to this escapist tendency—a
way to apologize for creating without consideration of intention or content: the poetics of
making stand for themselves. The second, iconological, is abstract in so far as it seeks to
represent the unrepresentable, resulting in abstract form. There is a kind of forced logic
here—a kind of apology in the title. It is a reverence of the symbolic. A reverence, in a
way, of that which is like, but never is. The third model is compositional: a concern that
seeks to eliminate content by reducing the image surface to basic formal principles. And
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the fourth model is non-compositional, which is described as the “programmatic
insistence on the non-agency of the artist” (8). This kind of theoretical criticality,
exemplified, as Bois points out, by Malevich, leads us to conceptual, rule-based artistic
practices in which the artist is beginning to question the nature of the art object, its
intrinsic value, and what it is charged with representing. This evolution can be seen
particularly clearly in the realm of musical composition, where John Cage, for instance,
begins to base notational and orchestral choices on chance operations. Later,
Stockhausen, Cardew, and Zorn all commit themselves to producing graphic scores, in
which autonomy is given to the musicians to make choices in the composition that result
in drastically varied, unrepeatable versions. In these cases, the non-agency of the artist is
insisted upon.
For someone like Malevich, who is questioning the validity of his skill-set in the
early 20th century, it must have been a surreal experience to see more and more
photographic representations of, for instance, villages. 10 Might this mechanical
reproducibility have challenged and deflated his attempts at representation, or his
motivation to represent at all? Such constructive questioning by Malevich allowed future
artists to “operate beyond the simple binary distinction of representational and abstract”
(27).
In fact, it seems that technological advancement of both visual and auditory
reproducibility led to art as a cognitive, as well as aesthetic, endeavor, even as artists such
as Kandinsky sought to transcend “the dreary quotidian world” (28). These explorations
10

This is a reference to one of Malevich’s experimental poems cited by Masha Chlenova in her essay for
“Eight Statements.” To quote Chlenova, “By hand-writing the word ‘village’ within a rectangular
frame, the artist points to the opening up of meaning that occurs once the arbitrariness of the sign is
made apparent, see Dickerman et al., p. 20.
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either gave rise to or happened simultaneously with philosophical and scientific interests
in technology, information, and relativity—further kinds of abstraction in other fields.
The emerging field of media archaeology, a variation of (or maybe deviation
from) media and cultural studies, provides useful context for the influence of
technological advancement on the arts throughout the 20th century. Media archaeology,
arguably stemming from the work of media theorist Friedrich Kittler, is currently being
defined by scholars such as Wolgang Ernst, Jussi Parikka, and Erkki Huhtamo. 11 I will
offer a simplistic definition for the purposes of this paper: media archaeology is the study
of the techniques and mechanisms of mediation, rather than of the content and narratives
that these media carry, for archival and historical purposes. “In the theories surrounding
media archaeology,” according to Parikka in his essay titled “Mapping Noise,” “noise,
not meaning, is quite often the focus for histories of technical media.” In this way, “Noise
becomes an index of archival logic” (256).
Although I will expand on notions of noise and noise-based practices in a later
section, it is worth noting that the choice of medium and the blurring of media in general
seem to emerge as integral conditions of artistic innovation throughout the late 19th, early
20th centuries. As the media landscape became increasingly dense with informationcarrying mechanisms and devices, the traditional delineations began to dissolve and the
distinguishing attributes were complicated. The invention of photography had a
groundbreaking influence on painting; the gramophone allowed for auditory transmission
and reception to be a dislocated, disassociated experience; Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle prompted philosophers and cultural theorists to question the nature of sensory
11

For more on media archaeology, see Media Archaeology: Approaches, Applications, and Implications,
edited by Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi Parikka.
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validation and truth; Muybridge proved that the horses’ feet are all four off the ground;
Duchamp put a urinal into a gallery; Cage hammered nails into a piano. With each
technological development, artists and producers adapted their practices and folded their
ideas into the fray. The content of the work became increasingly tethered to the medium
of expression: McLuhan, it seems, was spot on.
To illustrate the historical relevance of noise—the unintended residue of the
medium—over meaning, from a media archaeological perspective, consider the
photograph View from the Window at Le Gras by Ni pce in 1826. The first image to be
created using a camera, the grainy, textured information is extremely noisy. Due to this
noise, it is much more beautiful (or maybe ugly, mysterious, depressing, depending on
your interpretation) than it is specifically informative, or meaningful. The historical value
of Ni pce’s image, however, is aligned with the making of the image—the information
derived from the experimentations and actions of the photographer—and machine that
made it. The photograph holds a place in the history of image-making as a remnant of an
action more so than as a record of specific content, the view of the cityscape out the
window. Otherwise, the image is relevant on the same scale as a similarly looking
expressive charcoal drawing: attending purely to intended content, therefore, becomes a
detriment to the potential collective understanding and cultural significance of the image.
The noise—the distortions of intended content—provides a common ground on which to
understand and discuss the impact of the image. Noise, in this way, becomes fact, a place
for agreement outside of the subjective interpretations of the intended narrative. I’ll
expand on this notion of noise as a kind of liberation from intended narrative in a later
section.
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Philippe-Alain Michaud’s essay in “Eight Abstractions” offers an extremely
useful point of departure for my analysis of the artistic trajectories stemming from
modernism (Dickerman, et al. 45-48). His focus on photography, and photographic
conditions of referentiality, leads us to the decidedly 20th century concern for
technological mediation. His argument for Man Ray as an abstract artist, while valuable
within the contextual opposition between abstraction and referentiality, is incomplete. I
would argue that Man Ray’s explorations in photography were not so much alternatives
to representation (in regards to his motivation) or “frustrations” of referentiality, but
rather that he arrived at abstraction as the result of mechanical and material curiosity
(48).12 He seems to have been engaged in a kind of material bending, while Malevich, for
instance, was still concerned with what his picture was or was not.
This is an important difference to define: it seems there are two distinct
trajectories that stem from early 20th century breaks with modernist individualism,
which, while blurring into each other, imply different artistic motivations and priorities.
Nam June Paik’s 1965 Magnet TV, referred to in the Whitney Museum collection
catalogue as a “prepared television” is situated between John Cage’s prepared piano
(1938) and the current movement of glitch art, with roots in the 80s and 90s and spurred
on by the technological acceleration of the information age. This is what I will refer to as
the bending trajectory. The other trajectory is what I will call conceptual. The conceptual
break with modernist individualism, while arguably extending from Malevich, as
12

To briefly expand on this notion of arriving at, consider, for instance, Picasso. I would argue that Picasso
arrived at Cubism through a similar kind of material and conceptual curiosity regarding the
relationships between time and perception. A figure, represented from various angles, positions, and
points in time, remains a single figure, albeit an abstracted one. The image, at least for the purposes this
argument, is the result of criticality of perception—the residue of an action, the container for a
particular breakthrough in our cultural understanding of perception.
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described above, is more clearly argued as Duchampian. Joseph Beuys’s belief, for
instance, in universal human creativity, exercised through his “social sculptures” and
Fluxus “happenings,” is situated between Duchamp’s notion of “the creative act” and the
current form-questioning participatory art and social practice movements (818).
This is not to say that the artistic trajectories of bending and conceptual are
mutually exclusive. Motivations of technological experimentation stem from conceptual,
fixed-product-questioning, often political inclinations, just as politically motivated
conceptualists often fix their critical analysis on the mechanisms of form and the
conventionality of social messages. Cage, for instance, was heavily influenced by
Duchamp. The writings and practices of Debord and the Situationists led conceptual
artists to experiment with the conditions of everyday life and challenge the conventional
routines that were (and arguably still are) latent with political and social implications.
Artistic practice was in direct service to political and social criticism and activism. To use
a famous example, Duchamp’s urinal was,with wit, urgency and irony, situated as an art
object: the detritus of the everyday was placed inside the lofty space of the gallery.
While bending seems similarly political, it is a more formally aesthetic, nuanced
approach to what might be considered an activist practice, as opposed to the more direct,
overtly revolutionary conceptual trajectory, which often seeks to actively replace social
and political constructs with others. The bending-conceptual comparison is useful in
analyzing aspects of my own artistic practice that consistently rise to the top of my
priorities, merge, and act as foundations: particularly aspects of appropriation, noisebased practices, and site-specific interventionist tactics.
The below quote by John Cage is instructive in considering this split in practices
that emerged out of modernist individualism. Cage, in a 1973 interview with Art in
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America, states: “A contradiction between Marcel [Duchamp] and myself is that he spoke
constantly against the retinal aspects of art, whereas I have insisted upon the physicality
of sound and the activity of listening” (qtd. in Roth 80-81). Duchamp, in arguing against
artistic preoccupation with visuality—a foundation for art-making and appreciation that
he might have considered an ornamental indulgence—, attempts to reduce the conditions
that allow for taste as a factor in artistic reception. Cage attempts the same kind of
reduction in, famously, his composition 4’33”, his silent piece, in which a performer,
following explicitly scored instructions, sits silently at a piano for four minutes and
thirty-three seconds.
While the world of visual art, according to Duchamp, required visual reduction in
order to create the conditions for conceptual, cognitive expansion, the world of music, for
Cage, required auditory reduction in order to consider the nature of sound itself, the role
of the composer as framer, and the mechanical and physiological relationships to its
production. This latter concern, the mechanical and physiological, signals Cage’s
technological interest and solidifies him within the trajectory of bending. Duchamp’s
replacing (rejection of the visual in order to liberate the conceptual), therefore, versus
Cage’s extending (inclusion of unintended and uncomposed sound in order to expand the
definition of music). This binary, replacing-extending, will be considered in later sections
on appropriation.

Aestheticize, Aestheticize Not
When I consider what drives my motivation as an artist I relate with many of the broad
characteristics of the various participatory art and social practice movements. I do not
particularly strive for success within the gallery construct, and my work attempts to resist
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“art for art’s sake,” at least in the market-driven or autonomous sense, in the interest of
taking on sociological and psychological topics that concern the culture at large. As
Bourriaud states in his 2002 essay, Postproduction, “It is no longer a matter of starting
with a blank slate, or creating meaning on the basis of virgin material but of finding a
means of insertion into the innumerable flows of production” (8). There are simply too
many available and enticing topics, concepts, modes of production, and phenomena of
communication in the world within which to insert my ideas, criticisms, and aesthetic to
be concerned with a single institution, the traditional, market-oriented art world.
I am compelled to address the complex social practice movement in this section in
order to position my own work somewhere between it (what I argue is the current
manifestation of the conceptual trajectory) and the more materialist glitch movement (in
my view, the closest manifestation of the bending trajectory). Projects such as
PlayLaborPlay, the generally dialogical result my studio work hopes to provoke, and the
integral place teaching and collaborating hold in my practice, point to the need to address
issues of social practice and participation in a thorough analysis of my work. The glitch
movement, while not directly related to the appearance of my work, embodies the brand
of misuse (a term I have mentioned previously and will address in the “Methods” section)
that I aim to employ in my work: in short, a brand of appropriation that seeks to
repurpose rather than replace.
Both the glitch and social movements are broad conglomerations of artists,
tendencies, and practices and I will not attempt to specifically define them—living, as we
are, in the midst of their evolution, iterations, and impact. As Susan McClary states
regarding the evolution of popular music in her essay, “Rap, Minimalism, and Structures
of Time in Late Twentieth-Century Culture,” “The historian of the future will have the
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luxury of looking back on our era, to see what turns out to have been important after all”
(296). The tendencies of these two movements are simply the most convenient
manifestations of artistic practice in which to frame my own: a straddle position best
contextualized through some of Bourriaud’s theoretical contributions. Bourriaud’s
theories find a way to de-materialize the art object while maintaining the artist’s aesthetic
authority: devaluation of the object without devaluing the artist (a trap that the extremity
of the social and participatory practices falls into) and co-option of cultural technologies
and forms without succumbing to gadgetry (a trap that the extremity of glitch falls into).
In this respect, I do not consider my work in either camp, but rather it attempts to skim
from and utilize both.
It is, however, the anti-aesthetic implications of the social and participatory
movements, potentially stemming from anti-market motivations which I share, that
compels me to engage in a deeper critique than I will of the glitch movement. The
tendencies of glitch are already more closely tethered to the trodden and default
traditional forms of art and artistic authority. It is, in a sense, the over-emphasis of form
in glitch tactics that I take issue with, often relying on the sensorial appearance of misuse
to satisfy a place within a conceptual practice. In short, I want more intentionality and
composition from glitch and more aesthetic nuance from social and participatory forms.
It is, however, this under-emphasis of form by the latter that requires more attention.
Why the urgency about this under-emphasis? I am concerned about the increasing
institutionalization of what is essentially a broad theoretical structure for the situation of
art, which might gradually have the effect of mistaking this situational structure—this
process—as a new kind of form or style. I will expand on what is potentially at stake
here, but in a general sense, I am concerned about age-old self-organizing, uniquely
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socializing communities of art—the penchant the art-making process already has for
creating community—becoming absorbed into the myopia of genre delineation. Projects
like PlayLaborPlay run the risk of being pigeonholed into this false new form or antiform—an eventuality that would dilute its ephemeral, interventionist, and inclusionary
power.
It is important to make a distinction here between interpretations of these social
movements in art, as well as to clarify my particular concerns. There seems to be a
clearly discernible split in the definition of social practice between its position as a way of
being or artistic behavior and as a genre or discipline.13 The former resists market
economies, the latter succumbs to—is absorbed by—them. The distinction, therefore, is
like comparing apples and oranges.
It is an odd, however historically repetitive, phenomenon: the avant-garde
searches for ways to subvert, or at least circumvent, market pressure only to be gradually
assimilated into the commodity system. To follow my previous historical analysis, the
artists of the conceptual trajectory (Duchamp; Beuys, for instance) resisted, subverted,
and circumvented in various ways, only to be institutionalized, as the impacts of their
contributions gradually became marketable. The current iteration of social practice,
therefore, as a way of being is the most recent attempt at this age-old circumvention. It is,
therefore, a behavior rather than a particular form or aesthetic.
Consideration of the potential form and aesthetic of social practice, the behavioral
social practitioner would argue, is where Bourriaud’s notion of relational aesthetics
comes under fire. For the sake of this argument, his theories paved the way for the
13

These distinctions owe enormously to the guidance of my thesis committee chair, Susan Jahoda, and her
extensive work with The Pedagogy Group on solidarity economies.
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movement’s inevitable institutional absorption: a reductionist neutralization of the
movement’s initial revolutionary impulses. It certainly does not seem to me that this
neutralization was Bourriaud’s intention, but rather it is, potentially, a naturally occurring
by-product of cultural understanding and palatability within a consumer-based structure:
digestible cultural products are demanded, and are therefore supplied. With interest and
understanding, it seems, comes this natural characteristic of the market’s economic
process. Bourriaud, it seems, fails to offer a structural alternative to the market.
In a critique of Relational Aesthetics, Stewart Martin writes, “What is absent is
criticism of what is in many ways most fundamental, . . . a critique of the political
economy of social exchange that is implicitly proposed by Relational Aesthetics” (271).
What is criticized is Bourriaud’s omission of market concerns—concerns that are often
(somewhat hypocritically) intrinsically tethered to the content and form of the projects he
cites. By rendering “discursive and dialogic projects more amenable to museums and
galleries,” as Claire Bishop states, celebratorily, he ignores this potential hypocrisy, while
simultaneously, incidentally, igniting an integral public debate about the artist’s job (2).
By making discursive projects amenable, as Bishop argues, he paves the way, not only
for the movement’s inevitable institutionalization (a valid criticism), but also for an
integral discussion about the sustainability of artistic practice within a market economy (a
valid contribution). Bourriaud offers us new ways to consider appropriation, cultural
forms, and tactics of insertion akin to de Certeau’s tactical creativity (a term I will
address in a later section).
Bourriaud’s omission of market concerns, however, has posed myriad problems
for the designation of social practice as a way of being, as opposed to a genre (the
institutionalization of a practice or behavior, for instance, a contradiction in terms). It is
28

this institutionalizing problem that has led to a misrepresentation of social practice as
anti-aesthetic. To clarify, the characterization of social practice as a behavior rather than
a genre is entirely beside the point of form. This behavioral social practice is more
concerned with the economic forces that structure the arts than with any particular form
(or anti-form) for which it might be mistaken. A behavioral social practitioner, for
instance, might decide to stop producing art objects as a tactic to resist market pressures,
but this decision does not produce a new form; it is rather a political, activist impulse to
seek an alternative structure. That artist, theoretically, might continue to participate in
artistic production, but might identify his or her own audiences and communities that are
outside of the traditional realm of the market.
Herein lies the problem with institutionalization: anti-form (at least in the
traditional art-object sense) becomes mistaken for, and glorified as, new form. Deskilling
then occurs, as technical craft and formal composition are de-prioritized, even rejected
outright. A backlash also occurs: behavioral social practitioners begin to rally against
aesthetics and form in resistance to the institution. In both cases— the institutional
formalization of anti-form, and the resistance of form as a tactic of activism—a version
of anti-aesthetics is unintentionally taking place.
To clarify these terms and my usages, I argue that this anti-aesthetic tendency is
no fault or tenet of any one movement or theory, but rather the result of a confluence of
factors. The behavioral social practice movement, in that it is more concerned with
political and economic structures than genre forms, is not, therefore, the subject of my
criticisms of social practice. It is specifically the anti-aesthetic phenomenon that I take
issue with and aim to address. It is the institutionalization of social practice, not only in
museums and galleries, but also (maybe even more importantly) in universities, that is
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increasingly the purveyor of anti-aesthetic deskilling and, as an unfortunate, unintended
by-product, the catalyst of art’s gradual dissolution and its gradual alienation of the
public at large. It is, therefore, a crimp in artists’ timeless societal role as expressive
communicators, an unintended degradation, in a sense, of art’s benevolent power. While
Bishop, it would seem from her introduction, sees this institutionalization as expanding
the practice, the behavioral social practitioner would rather see it as exploitation.
When I refer to social practice in relation to anti-aesthetics, therefore, I am
referring to the movement as an institutionalized genre, and not as a behavioral practice.
For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this genre form as participatory art. This usage
follows Bishop’s logic in her introduction to Artificial Hells, in which she lists the many
terms that have come to characterize these forms of art. The term participatory art is
suitable in that it “connotes the involvement of many people . . . and avoids the
ambiguities of ‘social engagement’, which might refer to a wide range of work” (1). The
term also suits my usage in that it implies resistance to authored ownership: a
complicated, somewhat vague, form of resistance, which I will attempt to address.
A final issue to address regarding usage is to rectify Bourriaud’s theoretical
contributions (as I have characterized above) with the following criticism of participatory
art. If I am using the term participatory art to distinguish social practice as an
institutional genre versus behavioral practice, then participatory art is, theoretically,
aligned with Bourriaud’s texts. This would be a reductive, false equivalency: while
Rirkrit Tiravanija’s offering of free pad thai is reliant on participation, Gabriel Orozco’s
garden hammock is not, for example. When Bishop sets out to analyze participatory art,
she is decidedly not referring to any of Bourriaud’s relational artists. There are, rather,
two separate tracks of thought here: 1) the institutionalization of Bourriaud’s relational
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artists has, perhaps, resulted in form being de-emphasized within the institution, and 2)
the emergence of participatory art, perhaps in reaction against the former’s
institutionalization, has also resulted in de-emphasis of form. When I challenge
participatory art in regards to anti-aesthetics, therefore, it is not a critique of Bourriaud’s
relational artists. The residue of relational aesthetics, rather, might be considered an
unintended precursor to the anti-aesthetic sentiments of participatory art.
To aestheticize or not? The following are some analyses, concerns, and anxieties
about the nature of the artist’s skill-set and societal role as cultural producer.

The Anti-Aesthetic Phenomenon
What is the problem with anti-aesthetics if it is in resistance to the institutional art world?
The institution, after all, is detrimental to the position of art in society in that it is forced
(through factors of supply and demand, the stamp of originality, and the clout of
credibility) to overwhelmingly reference, either subtly or overtly, its own historical,
methodological, and material trajectory. The insularity of “art for art’s sake” is counter to
the power of art to communicate with various audiences and constituencies in formally
relevant ways, outside of the institutional boundary. The artist’s power, therefore, is in
being a kind of formal chameleon, able to translate ideas into various formats and
outputs—containers for whatever the communicative motivation might be. By way of
studio practice, therefore, the artist observes, synthesizes, and responds to the human
condition. The artist offers a singular version of our collective cultural construct, rather
than a mere product for consumption. The problem with anti-aesthetics, therefore, is in
the artist’s ambiguous societal future, at the other end of market resistance.
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That the artist offers this singular version is an important point, which
participatory art misses. Consider, for instance, McClary’s closing thoughts, continued
from above:
That [future] historian . . . will no doubt yearn to have experienced what it
was like to be alive at this very moment, trying to make sense of the
bewildering profusion of musical practices and critical opinions. That’s
why it’s so important for us to perform—if only from time to time—an
anthropology of ourselves. (296)
Just as Neipce’s famous image, for instance, as I’ve argued in the previous section, is an
informative remnant of an action, all artistic practices, techniques, and products are
integral to historical understanding of culture. The discrete artwork (to be clear, not
necessarily synonymous with the commodifiable art object), as I’ve argued, is a signpost.
It is an unsolicited human response and cultural reflection: a gift, therefore, to the culture
at large. It is “a vessel,” as Deresiewicz concludes, “for our inner life.” It is a cultural
artifact, just as noise, according to Parikka, is an invaluable artifact of technical media. It
seems we must keep following our creative impulses. We must keep making.
Artists, it seems, produce the invaluable noise of cultural history. Art, then, is
simply the intermediary: the nuanced form that all information takes when translated
through material. It is between the materials and the information—the medium and
content. It is a kind of cultural interim, navigated by intuition, gut feeling, and whatever
the limitations or breadth of the artist’s techniques happen to be. There is something
necessarily human—flawed, emotional, and indirect—about this space between material
and information.
The above, admittedly dramatic, interpretation of art is an attempt to find the
broadest possible definition in order to distinguish between whatever might be timeless
about it, and the various passing movements and circumstances that influence it. We
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might look back and consider that the market, after all, as Deresiewicz describes, has not
been around forever. We might look ahead and consider what effects the phenomenon of
anti-aesthetics might have on artistic practices in the future.
If art is more suitably considered a verb than a noun, then the art object is nothing
but a vessel, a carrier of information, even if this information is far-reaching, generalized,
abstracted, unresolved, unspecific, often with intangible communicative intentions. And
art is, of course, other things also. Sublime, subjective, mind-expanding, discomforting,
revolutionary, beautiful things to which a complete definition could never be pinned.
Rather than attempt to pin, I will only observe that art can be wrapped in many different
criteria for many different reasons. It is enticingly reckless. It seems to employ a timeless
language that predates the circumstantial trappings of Capitalism, the commercialization
of art objects, and the individualistic tendencies of late 19 th and early 20th century
modernism. Aesthetics, and the subtle seduction of form, might be the clearest way to
understand this timeless language. Someone, or some entity, shaping form, whether it be
an image, object, apparatus, experience, or some other psychological, dialogical, or
spatial construct yet to be conceived. Content, therefore, may be anything at all, whether
a radical liberal agenda, a docile motive, a playful sensibility, or a sensorial
experimentation—the form, it seems, is what brings the action, thought, or practice to
artistic critique. To use Viktor Shklovsky’s summation in his 1925 essay, “Art as
Device,” “Art is a means of experiencing the process of creativity. The artifact itself is
quite unimportant” (6).14

14

Shklovsky’s essay, particularly his notion that, “the device of art makes perception long,” will be
considered later in this paper.
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That form must be shaped, at least through the lens of this argument of aesthetics,
means that the individual cannot be removed from the art-making process, even as the
autonomous art object becomes ephemeral art experience and even as participatory art
attempts to remove the individual’s trace. The anti-aesthetic tendencies of participatory
art seem to equate aesthetics with authorship, and therefore with market acquiescence and
political conservatism (or at least tacit endorsement). But, as Bishop states: “Value
judgments are necessary, not as a means to reinforce elite culture and police the
boundaries of art and non-art, but as a way to understand and clarify our shared values at
a given historical moment” (8). Bishop is searching for ways to account for participatory
art that “focus[es] on the meaning of what it produces, rather than attending solely to
process” (9). Behavioral social practitioners might argue Bishop is trying to secure
herself a job: the cultural critic will have nothing to critique without artistic forms and
critical structures. Institutionalized social practitioners might be pleased with Bishop’s
endeavors: her diligent work of contextualization potentially securing them a place in the
canon. To offer criticism of both perspectives, the former is arguably an avoidant copout, the latter an opportunistic exploitation.
I am by no means on the side of the latter (I have argued previously that the
institutionalization of social practice might be the very culprit of the anti-aesthetic
phenomenon), but it is still disingenuous to believe that “there can be no failed,
unsuccessful, unresolved, or boring works of participatory art” (Bishop 13). It is
necessary, it seems, to find some way of separating works of participatory art from
similar projects in other realms, such as sociology, political activism, and community
organizing, or else, as Bishop states, “we risk discussing these practices solely in
positivist terms, that is, by focusing on demonstrable impact” (18). Resistance to
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aesthetic criteria and, by extension, authorship, at least when this resistance becomes
dogmatic orthodoxy, might signify a troubling diffusion of art—the artist’s timeless job,
technical skill-sets, and the invaluable historical index of singular versions of our
collective cultural construct—into societal ambiguity.
Might it be that this ambiguity is just the state that participatory art seeks? In that
institutionalization must be resisted, even Bishop’s secondary audience (the non-present;
the non-participant; the distant spectating remainder) might be irrelevant to the work.
Mediation, therefore, is irrelevant and, as follows, so is critique, qualification, or
canonization. This line of thinking leads back to my designation of behavioral social
practice as being more concerned with political and economic structures—art’s way of
being in the world—than with genre forms. It leads, in a way, to a kind of un-critiqueable
impulse. I’m not being shown the work; the work is not for me. A glorious aesthetic form
may well be shared with a very specific constituency to serve a very specific social
function, but I will not benefit from it because it will not be mediated. It will be, rather,
withheld.
This discussion of form and aesthetics, however, assumes, to some degree,
mediation of a work. It assumes that the work is an offering to the public domain: a
perspective to be shared, an artifact to contribute. Art, in this context, must be discussed
as a form of communication: a naturally occurring human phenomenon (as opposed to
market acquiescence) in which something or someone attempts to communicate with
something or someone else through some kind of technique of mediation.
Analysis of aesthetics, considering the above context, must imply some kind of
individual, choice-making authorship, even if this individual is a director, a directive
group, designer, or orchestrator, all of which are more nuanced titles than the singular
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authority (the genius, reclusive creator) of modernism. If the artist is a shaper,
collaborator, or conductor of something that would not have existed otherwise, he or she
is an author to some degree and must be held accountable for his or her choices in the
realm of some kind of aesthetics. Aesthetics and form, therefore, defined broadly, may be
the only criteria of art—the only condition that separates it from other disciplines.
In this way, the facilitator, the designer, the organizer, and the framer are all
artists, whose work might be critiqued based on the form (or various forms) it takes in the
world (accepting all of the subjectivity and vagueness that already comes with any kind
of artistic critique in the first place). Aesthetics, therefore, are not ornamental,
spectatorial, or politically conservative concerns, but rather practical, communicative,
and humanistic, in that they accept the art-making process as a nuanced language.
Consider Brian Eno’s rich, collaborative, and influential status in the realm of music,
straddled as he is between popular and classical musics of the late 20th century, quoted
here from his liner notes to his 1975 album Discreet Music:
Since I have always preferred making plans to executing them, I have gravitated
towards situations and systems that, once set into operation, could create music
with little or no intervention on my part. That is to say, I tend towards the roles of
the planner and programmer, and then become an audience to the results . . .
Issues of authorship and credit aside, what a shame it’d have been for Eno’s creative
inclinations and contributions to be absorbed into anti-aesthetic, anti-product
collectivism. In Discreet Music, Eno has given up much of his individual control to
technological systems, indeterminate resolutions, and collaborative negotiations. The
point, I suppose, is that there is a middle ground.
Bourriaud’s interpretation of the author, while in retrospect, arguably, naively
traditional, offers vital contributions to this discussion in regards to my previous
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designation of art as an action versus product. Given that Bourriaud’s relational artists
have become institutionalized, their products securely fixed, their initial actions remain
valuable examples of insertion into cultural forms. This basic notion holds an integral
place within my analyses of the artist’s role as mediator of cultural forms and images, as
complicator of everyday life. Bourriaud’s theories find a way to privilege the artwork and
the value of the artist (antithetical to participatory art), while at the same time emphasize
“the sphere of human relations as [a new] site for the artwork…” (“Relational Aesthetics”
165) “These artists produce...” Bourriaud continues:
interhuman experiences that try to shake off the constraints of the ideology of
mass communications; they are in a sense spaces where we can elaborate
alternative forms of sociability, critical models and moments of constructed
conviviality. (166)
The artist, for Bourriaud, is indispensable in that he or she produces, elaborates, and
constructs. The artist nudges us, through form and aesthetics, toward cultural criticality
and anti-spectatorial dialogics. The artist, in a sense, continues to make an offering; to
participate in the timeless language of art; to extend definitions of form to include the
sphere of human relations, rather than resist form itself. Bourriaud goes on to state that
“We no longer try to make progress thanks to conflict and clashes, but by discovering
new assemblages, possible relations between distinct units, and by building alliances
between different partners” (166). The artist, then, is engaged in a negotiation.

What to Make, What to Do, What to Teach
It would be reductive to believe that artists today are either art world producers of objects
working within the collector model or participatory artists teetering precariously on the
edge of liberal activism. To reflect on my own path, I was certainly drawn to art through
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an activist impulse. From an early age I was interested in mediation of all kinds, and its
role in the construction of individual identity, national attitudes, and the shapes of history.
As I learned, experimented, and engaged, I judged that our culture should be more
actively critical of the ways in which our experience in the world is mediated. Art became
the venue for this activist impulse—a method to communicate, criticize, illustrate, and
embody ideas about the human condition in ways that strove to be exploratory and
nuanced, as opposed to didactic and dictatorial. This is my hesitation, as I’ve described
above, with the anti-aesthetic phenomenon: that we gradually lose the ability to
communicate in a nuanced, poetic, open-ended fashion. We lose, therefore, the language
of art.
Take, for example, an artist collective whose stated practice is providing and
running art programs for local children (Kennedy). While this is a noble and worthy
organizational pursuit, it begs a question about what art education is. What does the artist
collective teach its students? If it teaches students institutionalized forms of social
practice, and not art in some traditional, objective sense, then how is the collective’s
work differentiated from another community center or service program? How is funding
differentiated? If the collective is teaching art in a more traditional sense (which is far
more likely), then where does it leave the students who, in the assumed opinion of the
collective, would be preparing for an obsolete or exploitative industry?
These questions complicate the virtues of art education and its role in shaping the
minds of, say, kindergarteners. Do artists of the future know how to use a hammer, how a
camera works, or how to organize a composition? Are these things still relevant to them,
or are technical skills gradually farmed out to various trades? In what form do trades
exist? Shifting emphasis from object to action, celebrating and teaching skills of
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collaboration, situating art making as relational versus autonomous: these pedagogical
inclinations maintain aesthetic criteria and educational progress where the deskilling
effects of anti-aesthetics hits a wall.
This concern might even be less ideological than I’ve implied, but rather more
logistical: how does one have the time to teach both the foundational skills of drafting as
well as the sociological and communitarian tactics of participatory art? How do we
categorize and prioritize them within a single curricular mission or funding stream?
Might it be more productive to stop treating participatory art as a form of art and rather
consider it a structural apparatus, a way of being? If in fact the anti-institutional form of
social practice is concerned not with what is being made, but how, might there be a more
suitable venue than the field of art? I pose these rhetorical questions with full
understanding that, for the politically motivated social practitioner, the field of art is, in
fact, the most important one. It is the battlefield of the anti-market issue surrounding
cultural production, a fact that in itself threatens to be its institutionalizing demise. It
might be more productive, therefore, to suggest an extension of emphasis, rather than a
replacement of concerns: a studio practice, for instance, that more actively considers its
function in the world, outside of its marketability, its function more as a place of meeting
than object of production.
A studio practice applied to a social practice, therefore, is an extremely positive
prospect. Even if only minimal or supplemental, a studio practice might be thought of as
the gateway to a social practice: the avenue to active application of the work to
ephemeral, collaborative, or socially engaged projects. A kind of activism, therefore, that
is rooted in some form of production. The Museum of Contemporary Art Detroit, for
instance, would not have engaged with Mike Kelley’s work as social practice had it not
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been based previously on a practice of production (Kennedy). “Mobile Homestead,”
therefore, is a kind of application for Kelley’s work. Theaster Gates’s brand of
community building and neighborhood revitalization is built on the back of his traditional
ceramics practice (often referred to in his lectures and artist talks as leverage). It seems,
then, that many, if not most, artists today are engaged with various social, cultural, and
political concepts through their work. The work is a conduit to these societal needs, and
the artist is increasingly adept at navigating and expanding the limits of institutions and
platforms, at inserting him or herself into the available forms.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS

Introduction
I will begin this discussion of methods by addressing the activist impulse. Duchamp and
Cage—and the respective trajectories of conceptual and bending I’ve attributed to
them—continue to provide useful frameworks here. Where the participatory art
movement (conceptual/Duchamp) might be rooted in activism, the glitch movement
(bending/Cage) might be rooted in experimentation. Where the former relies more
heavily on intentionality (maybe even didactically so), the latter relies on indeterminacy.
Where the former is moralistic, the latter is observational. Although there are many ways
to describe the practices by which our culture straddles the above binaries, Lev
Manovich, in his essay “The Practice of Everyday (Media) Life” is eloquent in
addressing the dilemma of resisting, versus contributing to, media saturation and
capitalistic interest, particularly in relation to Baudrillard’s notion of simulation and de
Certeau’s text, The Practice of Everyday Life.
When Manovich states that “the logic of tactics has now become the logic of
strategies” he argues that this new strategy operates as a hyperreality (38). To reference
the work of Baudrillard, the hyperreal is experienced as real, as opposed to a
representation of the real, but is actually referential—an indirect, mediated construction,
distantly departed from whatever original form it resembles. Deceptive and seductive, it
is taken as real. Manovich acknowledges the relevance of the hyperreality phenomenon
by noting that “content [referring to user generated content and what he might judge as
lay production] is . . . driven by social media companies themselves” (36). These
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companies, by simulating the tactics of remix culture (or maybe rather directly employing
them: a confusing diffusion that is reminiscent of the dilemma of hyperreality itself) have
successfully co-opted them. These companies, therefore, have systematized these tactics
into a strategy for generating capital. 15
It is this constant co-option, technology after technology, innovation after
innovation, for the purposes of capital that leads me to align my studio practice with what
Manovich (using de Certeau’s term) calls “tactical creativity.” In navigating our mass
media culture, I “expect to have to work on things in order to...make them habitable”
(40). In the spirit of Manovich’s remix culture, there is so much material out in the
world—so much vague noise and sporadic signal—that must be read, decoded, and
demystified. The nuanced language of art and aesthetics might be the most effective
tactic to soften the edge of authority; to resist capitalistic interest. Tactical creativity, in
this way, is seductive, and free to be indeterminate and experimental.
Maybe, in this way, change simply comes slowly. My own relationship to remix
culture, tactics of appropriation and intervention, and media activism as a nuanced
(versus direct) pursuit is rooted in a desire to deconstruct: to find the seams, to debunk
the illusion. But what makes tactical creativity so effective is that it does not linger in
mere deconstruction. Bourriaud’s Postproduction artists, for instance, go “beyond what
we call the art of appropriation, which naturally infers an ideology of ownership, and
[move] toward a culture of the use of forms…” (4). This going beyond signals an
important shift in the implication of appropriation: a shift in relevance and intended effect

15

Although Manovich leaves these companies mostly unspecified, he refers directly to the phenomenon of
fan generated anime music videos (AMVs) and also implies the influence of increasingly accessible and
user-friendly Adobe and Mac software.
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from replacing cultural structures and forms (a notion more closely attributed to the
activist tendencies of the conceptual trajectory) to repurposing (more closely attributed to
the experimental tendencies of the bending trajectory).16 Remixing, therefore, is in order
to generate new productive connections between already existing, pervasive, and
increasingly ownerless content and form, to construct new and sustainable strategies for
making meaning; for keeping up with the perpetual flow of media culture, for the
maintenance of activity over passivity. Appropriation, therefore, is to deconstruct and
demystify, only to reconstruct with a new patina of association and myth, a method of
production that is not so much spectatorial submission as dialogical negotiation, a
practice concerned less with fixed products than transient versions.

The Activist Impulse
I will return to the topics of noise and appropriation, but first continue with the activist
impulse that is in many ways at the root of my studio practice. Among the many
influences that are more obviously apparent in my work, as well as more entrenched
within the boundaries of art, the arguably non-artist group The Yes Men comes to mind.
The Yes Men is a lighthearted activist group that embeds itself into the public eye and
tells the truth in the guise of the authority on which it is commenting: work that takes the
form of simulated websites and press conferences, a brand of satire that works gradually
on the minds of the public. This group employs an aesthetic sensitivity akin to the
language of art: like a chameleon, it must take on various cultural forms to a degree of

16

This binary of replacing-repurposing is related to that of replacing-extending, described earlier in this
paper. The former is simply a more precise way to position the evolving cultural implications of
appropriation.
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passability and offer alternative positions, associations, and narratives from this simulated
place of authority. It intervenes rather than waits for an invitation. It embodies the form it
critiques.
I’ll briefly summarize a particular case. In November, 2004, The Yes Men
finagled an opportunity to represent The Dow Chemical Company on the 20th
anniversary of the 1984 Bhopal tragedy, in which 5,00017 residents were accidently killed
when Union Carbide’s (now part of Dow) pesticide plant sprung a leak (“A Legacy
Acknowledged”). The Yes Men, having set up a fake, yet entirely believable, alternative
Dow website, created a place from which the supposed company would address the
Bhopal disaster. Anyone doing an Internet search about the disaster, or even simply about
the company itself, would easily stumble upon The Yes Men site and mistake it for
Dow’s.
In November, the BBC did just that and contacted the alternative site—The Yes
Men—to request an interview with a Dow representative on the disaster’s 20th
anniversary. The Yes Men followed through, sent a representative, and, on the air during
the interview, announced that “Dow will accept full responsibility for the Bhopal disaster,
and has a $12 billion dollar plan to compensate the victims and remediate the site” (“A
Legacy Acknowledged”). Their announcement generated, at worst, an enormous amount
of press attention for the disaster, which had gone relatively ignored in the US, and at
most, a deluge of questions and comments for Dow to field, forcing the company to
hedge on its supposed promise, its non-action in the wake of the disaster suddenly plain
for the public to see. By exploiting common modes of communication and intervening
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Many more followed, stemming from residual effects of the spill.

44

into established cultural forms, The Yes Men engaged in a nuanced, simulationist,
performative tactic of resistance: the language of art applied to activist intentions.
Another example that comes to mind, outside of the realm of art, was a social
media sensation in October, 2012. A video, just under three minutes, spread like fire
across the Internet. The video depicts Pastor Phil Snider, in August of that year, speaking
at a Springfield, MO, City Council public hearing on an amendment that would add
LGBT people to the list of minorities protected under a new non-discrimination
ordinance. While Snider makes clear at the start of his speech that he is in favor of the
ordinance (an immediate break from character that, for instance, The Yes Men would
have rather maintained), he goes on to speak from the opposite position and cites various
Christian leaders that support the assertion that “any accurate reading of the bible should
make it clear that gay rights goes against the plain truth of the word of God.”
But just shy of two minutes into his anti-homosexuality speech, Snider seems to
lose his place and stumbles over his words as he mistakenly says the phrase, “the right of
segregation.” This is the point at which Snider’s interventionist tactic begins to take
shape. He seems to have “brought the wrong notes” and he apologizes before confessing
to the assembly that “what I have been reading you this whole time are direct quotes from
white preachers from the 1950s and the 1960s, all in support of racial segregation. All I
have done is simply taken out the phrase racial integration and substituted it with the
phrase gay rights.” While there is a direct action taking place here in that Snider is
directly appealing to voters of the ordinance, his action takes on a more poetic afterlife. It
is the nuance and craft of the performance that carries the content to a larger audience.
Snider, in this public hearing, leveraged the credibility of his own position in the
community to engage in an act of tactical creativity.
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These tactics of media intervention, which are intended to disrupt the spectator’s
expectations and insert new associations and narratives, bring up an important binary to
consider: that of transparency-opacity, mentioned earlier in this paper. As information is
polished through technological advancement, the mechanism—the mode of
communication—becomes more transparent (transparent as opposed to, for instance, the
opacity of Ni pce’s camera, as discussed previously). What is the consequence of a
transparent medium, and how might it lead to manipulation and corruption? If we receive
pure content and are not cognizant or critical of the medium, might we be relegated to
passive spectator, unequipped to interpret the subjectivity of the information?
Through the lens of tactical creativity, spectators must hold the power of
interpretation, appropriation, and active use, able to imagine and, according to de
Certeau, “insinuate their countless differences into the dominant text” (xxii). The
spectator is, therefore, empowered, activated, and able to contribute to the decidedly
subjective problem of communication and to navigate the interim between transparency
(absorption in content, pure spectacle) and opacity (criticality of content, dialogical
negotiation). I will return to these conditions of absorption and criticality, particularly in
relation to time-based and popular media, in a later section on “Content.”
The gradual transparency of media over time is particularly relevant to the
motivations of media education. As information is polished through factors such as
technological advancement (increasing automation and precision of devices, for instance)
or cultural ubiquity of narrative strategies (the pervasive plot formula of a film, the
predictable structure of a political debate), dialogical negotiation becomes increasingly
difficult and active insertion becomes harder to imagine. To engage with the carrier of
information is just as important, if not more so, than the information itself.
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Consider, for instance, the importance of the transparency-opacity binary in
relation to consumer culture and advertising. Production Notes: Fast Food For Thought,
a 1986 video piece by Jason Simon, addresses the artist’s role in standing between the
two poles of medium and content, in employing tactical creativity that stands between
activism and artistic production. In Production Notes, Simon attempts to elucidate the
medium, which had, in the mid-80s, become increasingly transparent through the many
strategies of advertising.
Simon shows the viewer various television commercials advertising products such
as McDonalds, Colt 45, and Mars Bars. Following each ad he slows the video down and
replaces the audio with a recorded reading of the production notes, “sent from the
advertising agency to the production company,” as Simon explains in the recording. The
notes describe the agency’s intentions with each scene, actor, and expression, while the
viewer analyzes the images in slow motion.
Simon employs opportunistic leverage, similar to Snider and The Yes Men, in that
his piece was made possible by his time working for these production companies: a kind
of embedded social practice before such intervention was co-opted and on the road to
institutionalization. The difference is, of course, that Simon’s intervention has generated
a fixed product—a kind of activist artifact—while the anti-form tendencies of
participatory art, for instance, would likely not have engaged in such spectatorial
production. This is also not to claim that Simon’s piece has made any kind of direct,
tangible impact on the spectatorial consumer culture dilemma, only that, like Snider’s
intervention, it permeates our cultural consciousness with subtlety (versus confrontation,
Bourriaud’s “conflict and clashes”), and offers itself as a singular version of our
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collective cultural construct, an artifact of resistance through gradual negotiation
(“Relational Aesthetics” 166).
Where is this vague line, different maybe for each individual, in which the
activist’s moralism shifts from enlighteningly educational to didactically impositional? I
will consider this question through the binary moralistic-observational, and through a
critique of Thom Andersen’s masterful 2003 film, Los Angeles Plays Itself.18

Incongruous chase scenes; ominous architecture; filmic depictions that run parallel, as
odd simulations, to the real life political, cultural, and economic states of the city of Los
Angeles: Andersen's ruminations on the city’s landscape and its co-option for the sake of
fiction are what grip me for the film's long three-hour duration. In these respects, Los
Angeles Plays Itself is a significant work in the discipline of film and cultural criticism.
Andersen is working with popular film—in most cases accessible, as opposed to
obscure—in order to support arguments and relationships arrived at through his research:
a voiceover essay set to movie scenes. His subtle reframing of context works to great
effect, since the viewer rarely gets lost in the original content. Andersen invites us into
the images and sounds—we are seduced by their familiarity and glossy production
value—only to tip us in particular directions. There is rarely tension between image and
voiceover, rarely a contradiction or arbitrary reference. As image and voice develop in
relation to each other, the viewer becomes reliant on the voiceover to frame the image—
to help the viewer see what is remarkable. What is so impressive about this film is that
the image/voice relationship is never didactic, never overtly moralistic, but rather remains
18

This brief criticism has been adapted from one written for Young Min Moon’s experimental Visual
Culture syllabus on Neo-Realist film, University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
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basically observational, descriptive in tone, rather than prescriptive, until the end, which I
will address.
What is it that makes the majority of the film feel more aesthetic and experiential
than explanatory and didactic? It certainly toggles delicately between these states but
remains mostly on the former side. I would argue it is because Andersen puts a certain
amount of trust in his viewer for the majority of the film. He seems to trust, by stating
certain facts and by drawing, as a kind of curator, certain relationships between data that
his viewer will make certain inferences. There is a trust that the viewer is capable of
insertion into Andersen’s observations and able to consider the virtues of his film: the
ways in which the film industry depicts and exploits economic inequalities; the
complexities of race relations in the city as well as our culture; the kind of psychic
displacement popular film imposes on the physical landscape of Los Angeles and its
actual inhabitants; the deleterious effects that product placement, archetypal portrayals of
gender, and depictions of socio-political and economic norms have on the psyches of
viewers and consumers. Throughout the film, Andersen trusts the viewer to read and
interpret the hypocrisies of the films and filmic devices he analyzes, and the result is a
brilliant education in media literacy. The viewer walks away with an enriched respect for
the construction of image and fiction, as well as a keener eye for such construction in
future media consumption.
But by the end of the film, I am disappointed to find that Andersen has lost trust
in me. He seems to no longer believe that I can draw, through aesthetics and experience,
the correct conclusions from his brilliant observations and work of curation, and he
begins to proselytize. It is not that he reaches for a point that isn’t there—his arguments
continue to ring true—but it is that the work does not need them. To end such a thorough
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analysis, infused as it is with such sincere investment and personal observation, with a
broadly damning tone feels like an empty gesture: a misplaced resentment with no
particular culprit or solution. In fact, it seems he should have begun a whole new project
to address the half-hearted points on race in his conclusion—points with which he
attempts to crystallize the perspectives of his whole film. The film, therefore, in its
conclusion tips from an observational tactic (effective in its subtlety and humility) to a
moralistic one (patronizing in its directness and condemnation). Veering all too close to a
clash, it is, in a way, a broken negotiation.

The Misuse Impulse
To follow the observational-moralistic discussion—the effective tactics of observational
insertion versus moralistic imposition—it seems that the activist impulse tips into misuse
and, more specifically, noise-based tactics. A discussion of noise is most productively
framed as the residue or byproduct of communication. This frame stems largely from the
definition of noise in information theory as oppositional to signal. In this way, “a noise is
a signal the sender does not want to transmit” 19 (Russo and Warner 48). I will expand the
framework, for the purposes of this paper, from the technical mechanisms of
communication to include its formulas, structures, and intended meanings. This
expansion can be attributed to theorist Jacques Attali’s essay “Noise and Politics,” in
which analysis of noise is cultural: “In noise can be read the codes of life, the
relationships among men” (7). Even Andersen’s film, therefore, is arguably engaged in a
19

Warner and Russo, here quoting Abraham Moles, provide a lucid discussion of noise, in opposition to the
information theory framework, as virtual acoustical noise within the context of western musical
discourse, in which the qualifying distinctions between signal and noise break down when “attack
transients [as opposed to pure tone]...provide the primary perceptual cues for aural identification,” see
p. 49.
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noise-based tactic in that it attempts to tease unintended narratives and inferences out of
existing material; to dig beneath the intended narratives and unearth new interpretive
associations.
The Journals of Henry David Thoreau, written as notes during his time at
Walden, offer a valuable reference for this definition. Contextualized masterfully in an
article for Cabinet by D. Graham Burnett, professor of History of Science at Princeton
University, Thoreau was captivated by what he called the telegraph harp. Copper wire,
freshly installed to facilitate Samuel Morse’s telegraph communication system, cut
through Walden and created tones when it vibrated in the wind. “This unpredictable and
accidental music,” writes Burnett, “became, for the wanderer of Concord, a solace, a call,
a derangement of the senses” (63). Thoreau, in his writings, fixates on use and misuse of
technology with subversive intentions, underpinned by an activist impulse. The
material—the overhanging wire—is an imposition on the landscape and his daily life: an
unchosen environmental factor and sonic texture.
While the development of Morse’s telegraph system would lead to greater
connectivity and clarity of communication, Thoreau points to the invention as a
commercial, capitalistic advancement, and not a philosophical one in the grand scheme of
human connections. For Thoreau the telegraph harp is sublime—transcendent in ways
that the messages carried along the copper lines could never achieve. The beauty, value,
and wisdom, for Thoreau, is in the peripheral, authorless noise. As he states, “The high
purpose of all things lay in their creative misuse...thus I make my own use of the
telegraph” (qtd. in Burnett 65). Of this use, Burnett writes:
It is a use reserved, of necessity, to those who do not go to the end of the line,
those who do not reside at a node in the network of the modern world. Those
who do not go to the office. The truth is for those who are indifferent to ends.
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This earth-encompassing web, which embodied on a global scale the ubiquitous
urge to get from point A to point B, was at the same time—perfect irony!—a
cosmic harp upon which random winds played an endless, subversive symphony.
(65)
The necessary meaninglessness of noise—in that if noise had hierarchical meaning it
would be, rather, content—is for Thoreau a place of interpretation, beauty, and insertion,
freed from the specificity of signal. This is arguably the start of media archaeology,
discussed earlier in this paper, within which noise becomes a more valuable record than
the content the particular device carries. It is through the sublime beauty of the telegraph
harp that Thoreau directs our attention to the philosophical dilemmas of technological
advancement and its relationship to human connectivity. We are, therefore, indirectly
pointed toward Thoreau’s particular content: this high purpose of all things. We are
pointed by way of aesthetic sensitivity and misuse, our heightened attention brought to
the incidental and residual qualities of mediation. As Parikka writes in regards to
recorded audio: “The gramophone picks up not only the meaning inherent in human
speech, but just as effectively the whispers, the noises of the body, the extras of
communication, so to speak, that come with every opening of the mouth” (256-57).
Within these extras lies valuable, expansive information far more fertile for interpretation
and insertion than the intended content itself.
But Thoreau’s high purpose still carries a delusion of hierarchy—delusional in
that all hierarchy must be in some way dictatorial and, therefore, embedded with some
form of dogmatic meaning. Meaning, in this case, is not necessarily the enemy of
Thoreau’s implied freedom, but simply an obstacle to interpretation, so fixed as it appears
to us within a culturally agreed upon system of thought. “Forget subversion,” writes
music theorist Simon Reynolds in his essay “Noise”: “The point is self-subversion,
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overthrowing the power structure in your own head. The enemy is the mind’s tendency to
systematize, sew up experience, place a distance between itself and immediacy” (57).
The “obliteration of meaning,” as Reynolds refers to it, is the pleasure of noise—the
ecstasy found in “dispersing consciousness” (56-57). The strictures of meaning, it seems,
must be alleviated, if only on occasion, to make space in the mind, to make the return to
established structures a conscious choice rather than unconscious submission.
Noise, then, is reckless and free, anarchistic and self-subversive. It works
gradually against our own need for established form. “Listening to music,” explains
Attali, “is listening to all noise, realizing that its appropriation and control is a reflection
of power, that it is essentially political” (7). Like walking is controlled falling, music is
controlled noise; image is framed vision; object is constructed material; form is organized
information. The artist—and more specifically the media educator, theorist, cultural
producer—must repurpose established form in order to “extract new modes of production
from it,” new ways of seeing it (Bourriaud, Postproduction 4). This is Bourriaud’s “break
with the manipulation of reference and citation . . . through a problematics of the use of
cultural artifacts,” his “society as a catalog of forms” (7-8).

Extend or Replace, Repurpose or Reject
As the definition of noise expands to encompass the ubiquitous scatter of meanings,
narratives, and forms with which our culture grapples daily, a contradiction emerges: can
framed noise still be noise, or does its framing—its organizing—turn it into construction?
Does Thoreau’s listening to his telegraph harp differ from his pointing to it, and thereby
framing it, in his journals? Is noise, once systematized, simply convention? These
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questions begin to tip toward the topic of appropriation, in which recontextualization—
re-framing—is not only expected, but integral to its definition.
To follow Attali’s statement, all music (and by extension all form) is appropriated
noise (in its various structure-less iterations). If everything is noise until framed, then all
framing, at least in the cultural sense of Attali’s argument, is appropriative. Attali’s
notion eloquently precedes Bourriaud’s, reiterated here in full:
Artists’ intuitive relationship with art history is now going beyond what we call
the art of appropriation, which naturally infers an ideology of ownership, and
moving toward a culture of the use of forms, a culture of constant activity of signs
based on a collective ideal: sharing. (Postproduction 4)
The term appropriation, therefore, becomes an incomplete designation in this culture of
the use of forms—this sharing culture—in which no form is singularly sacred. All forms
are ripe for recontextualization, to be encountered as new. This is the artist’s urge to
extend rather than replace, to critique through use (co-optive repurposing) rather than
through omission (dismissive rejecting).
Cage’s 1952 silent piece comes to mind. 4’33” is a composition consisting of no
sound other than the incidental noises of the audience. The audience’s expectation of
linear content is co-opted in order to consider the nature of music, noise, spectacle, and
collective experience. 4’33”, though immensely impactful, might also be dismissed as
cynical. Why highlight the accidents, inconsequential data, and aspects of communication
that cause disconnection? Doesn’t this attention drive us deeper into a void of
miscommunication and isolation?
I would argue, rather, that Cage’s piece is an extension of the definition of music
to include unintended and uncomposed sound. All he has done is place a frame around
the otherwise unstructured, but still sonically present, noise. Cage, therefore, does not
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seek to replace traditional linear composition—an action that would carry the implication
of revolution reminiscent of the previously described conceptual trajectory—but rather to
extend it: a repurposing of noise rather than rejection. To imply that noise is to be
avoided is to prop hierarchical meaning and specificity of content on too high a pedestal.
All composition is, after all, already an appropriation of noise, at least in the context of
Attali’s argument. The implication is that noise simply exists, that it is ownerless and
free.
The thought is liberating: I am free to appreciate the unintended sounds of the
room as a kind of sublime composition, to listen to them as music. All forms that pass my
eye are fair game, potential fodder for recontextualization and application. How
constructive this notion of extension is—how productive! Rather than to rally against
established forms, structures, and systems of thought with the vague implication of
replacing them, it is more productive to repurpose them in the interest of creating new
venues for dialogue and understanding. Our society “as a catalog of forms” has become
increasingly appropriative in its own right. As Manovich has argued, tactics of resistance
are regularly systematized into strategies for generating capital. Artists—particularly
those working appropriatively—aim to find the edge of this system: to fold the edge back
into the fray, to smooth it out and diffuse its boundaries, to absorb it into the noisy
subjectivity of perception.
The artist’s co-option forces the hand of the system: as formulas become apparent
(or opaque) they lose their effectiveness, their ability to maintain whatever form of
control for which they were designed. When we extend these structures, we talk about
them. When we analyze the nuanced language of a political speech, the words cease to
persuade. When conventions of popular film are made apparent, cultural ideologies cease
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to impact our identities and personal opinions. We are no longer lost, therefore, in the
spectatorial scatter of seemingly fixed meanings, but rather freed to engage in an active
negotiation of meaning, our attention freed to receive the peripheral, the unintended, the
residual, the sub-textual, the message that the medium itself carries.
While these are lofty assertions, they serve to illustrate the extremity of this cooptive urge to repurpose. Jason Simon, with Production Notes, slows down
advertisements in order to analyze their construction. Paul Pfeiffer, through tactics of
digital subtraction in various projects, fixes our gaze on the balletic choreography of
popular sports. Jon Rafman, in his image archive, 9-Eyes, mines the mechanized images
of Google Street View for slices of sublimity and humanity. William Basinski, with his
Disintegration Loops, shows how repetition (a single looping melody) can change over
time, both as material (tape gradually disintegrating as it turns) and as perception (the
effect on the listener). Maybe even more importantly, these artists have set a path for the
audience to engage with recognizable material in new, aesthetic, expansive ways.
Basinski’s appropriated melodies—snippets from sources that could be Muzak,
classical pieces, advertisements, even old personal recordings—do not simply point back
to source; that is, they don’t exclusively question, criticize, reject, or address their source.
His pieces place these snippets in a context all their own: a haunting repetition that seems
both neverending and endlessly unique with each revolution of the loop. Basinski puts us
through an aesthetic, visceral experience with material we would not have guessed would
have affected us in such an emotive way. This is a unique inclusion of source in a
subsequent extension, Bourriaud’s new modes of production within ubiquitous
established forms.
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Brian Eno’s Three Variation on the Canon in D Major by Johann Pachelbel, the
B-side to his 1975 album Discreet Music, comes to mind. Along with collaborator Gavin
Bryars, Eno arranged the famous piece for the Cockpit Ensemble, each member of which
was given a brief excerpt of Pachelbel’s score to repeat and gradually alter over the
course of the recording. The result is a hauntingly mesmerizing, strangely recognizable,
unrepeatable version of the piece—an appropriative process that points both back to the
nature of source (the classical tradition; the fixed score) and forward as an entirely new,
aesthetic product.
This extending versus replacing binary speaks to a straddle position common in
these works, and in the lineage I hope to situate my own work: a general balance between
aesthetics and criticality. Eno’s notion of becoming, in both Discreet Music and the
Pachelbel variations, “an audience to the results” of his own plans and programs, sets up
a kind of system for sentimentality and aesthetic experimentation. This is Bois’s noncompositional model for abstraction: the “programmatic insistence on the non-agency of
the artist” (Dickerman, et al. 8). Eno seems to create structures in which he can be free,
which open doors for him and remove the burden of authored responsibility. There are, in
this way, two separate urges—both conceptual and aesthetic—that need to be satisfied for
the sake of both the maker and audience. Structure—some semblance of programmatic
criticality—is the anchor from which we might truly lose ourselves in aesthetics, an
allowance to get lost within conceptually nuanced, stake-holding structures.
Basinski’s Disintegration Loop 1.1 incites similar sentimentality, a further
example of the ways in which one’s perception of familiar or unremarkable material is
transformed through systematic structure. Basinski’s piece both incites meditation on
technological mediation and is, simultaneously, a moving aesthetic experience.
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Basinski’s looping melody, if discovered independently before his processing—maybe as
Muzak in the supermarket or an excerpt from a film score—would not evoke such
sentiment. Is it the suggestion of September 11, 2001? Basinski completed this piece on
this date. It played continuously on the roof of his Brooklyn building as he watched the
smoke rise. The cultural weight of this context is forever embedded in the piece. Or does
this sentimentality stem from generational curiosity about dead and swiftly dying
technological formats, gadgets, and entertainment products: a kind of memento mori of
communication technologies? For whatever the reasons—perhaps a mixture of nostalgia,
cultural comradery, cravings for memorials, interest in the information age, and a desire
for ambient sonic texture—Basinski’s piece, experienced at the right moment, is more
moving than any original score. Fragile information on tape, looped continuously over
tape heads, gradually disintegrating, falling apart like ash settling on the ground, the
sound blurring, warbling, slowing: a single loop, never once precisely repeated, fading
away.
It is working with the familiar that I want to emphasize in regards to appropriation
as a repurposing method. It is also why I am drawn to working with common spectacles
as subject matter: insertion into ubiquitous images and formulas; co-option of entrenched
narrative structures; the programmatic misuse of cultural codes and devices; the
immediate recognition, and subsequent conditioning, of the familiar.

Enstrangement
Perhaps the greatest argument for art as action, for the use of aesthetics to co-opt and
expand cultural perception, and for art as a venue for dialogical negotiation of meaning
versus habituated spectatorial reception, comes from Russian Formalist Viktor
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Shklovsky’s influential essay “Art as Device,” the first chapter of his 1925 Theory of
Prose. Shklovsky’s theory is based on the premise that “when we examine the general
laws of perception, we see that as it becomes habitual, it also becomes automatic” (4-5).
He goes on to compare this automatization to algebraic thought, in which “objects are
replaced by symbols”:
By means of this algebraic method of thinking, objects are grasped spatially, in
the blink of an eye. We do not see them, we merely recognize them by their
primary characteristics. The object passes before us, as if it were prepackaged.
We know that it exists because of its position in space, but we see only its surface.
. . . In the process of algebritizing, of automatizing the object, the greatest
economy of perceptual effort takes place. Objects are represented either by one
single characteristic (for example, by number), or else by a formula that never
even rises to the level of consciousness. (5)
What is Shklovsky’s antidote to this abstracting, algebritizing, generalizing tendency of
human perception? The creative device—the creative act—of enstrangement of the
familiar.
This is not a misspelling. Shklovsky’s term has been translated from Russian in a
few different ways. The term enstrangement was coined by translator Benjamin Sher in
an attempt to most closely resemble Shklovsky’s use in Russian, which is already an
intentional misuse of the native term. Sher, in the introduction to his translation, describes
the need for a new English term—reasoning which is integral to my own use of
enstrangement. Sher compares his term to two other translations: estrangement and
defamiliarization, neither of which fully encompasses Shklovsky’s intention. Both terms
carry an incorrect negative connotation. To defamiliarize or estrange something implies a
departure from the familiar without any trail back, diffusion of a familiar thing without
the thing having been imbued with any sort of new condition, without, in a sense, a new
familiarization. Sher summarizes:
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It is not a transition from the ‘familiar’ to the ‘unknown’ (implicitly). On the
contrary, it proceeds from the cognitively known . . . to the familiarly known, that
is, to real knowledge that expands and ‘complicates’ our perceptual process. (xix)
Sher’s enstrangement, therefore, implies complication of perception, as opposed to mere
diffusion. His term extends perception of a thing to include complicated ways of
understanding it—seeing it—rather than simply replacing immediate perception with
defamiliarized ambiguity. Enstrangement, rather, is a device through which perception is
imbued with new connotations: having been made strange, the familiar is then made new.
Enstrangement, therefore, is a term that perfectly straddles the complicated goals
of appropriation that I have discussed: the co-option of familiar, entrenched, ubiquitous
cultural forms for the purpose of complicating them, folding them back, as mentioned
previously, into the noisy subjectivity of perception in order to extract new modes of
production from them, as in Bourriaud’s context.
To exemplify this device, Shklovsky points to the work of Tolstoy. By doing so,
he provides a unique, seemingly paradoxical, opportunity to view Tolstoy’s work—
arguably the greatest products of literature—as artifacts of artistic action. “The devices
by which Tolstoy enstranges his material,” Shklovsky writes, may be attributed to the
fact that “he does not call a thing by its name, that is, he describes it as if it were
perceived for the first time” (6). Shklovsky goes on to explain, for instance, the ways in
which Tolstoy describes an account of flogging without ever using the word itself, a word
which would bring with it a world of algebraic abstraction and thereby soften the
perceptual impact of the activity—the true nature of the tortuous punishment. According
to Shklovsky, “flogging is enstranged by a description that changes its form without
changing its essence” (6).
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It is this basic notion of enstrangement that increasingly summarizes my every
artistic motivation. Within it can be derived an impulse for activism, in that it implies
urgency for a more heightened, active perceptual consciousness. It acknowledges the
complexity of, and potential danger in, entrenched meaning. It requires aesthetic and
formal sensitivity: a relationship with the material. It seeks to expand cultural
understanding of ubiquitous forms and invent new associations and uses. It asks, in short,
that one truly look at a thing; to practice active looking. Enstrangement embodies the
notion of art as dialogical negotiation: a tactic through which we might engage in
negotiated meaning. With the powerful influence of the device of enstrangement, I will
move on to address issues of content.
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CHAPTER 4
CONTENT

Introduction
The last Shklovsky quote I provided is particularly important to the ways in which
enstrangement relates to the content of my work. Shklovsky describes Tolstoy as having
changed the form of flogging without having changed its essence, as a literary tactic. I am
interested in the ways in which a simple flip of terms might relate to the
recontextualization of visual and auditory cultural forms. What might it mean, therefore,
to change the essence of, say, a baseball game without changing its form? To expand on
this question I’ll consider John Oswald’s influential tactic of Plunderphonics through his
1993 Plexure sound pieces.
As I listen to Oswald’s pieces, the fact of appropriation is the most immediately
apparent element; his material—pop music—is immediately recognizable. The sound
seems concretely visual—an image in the mind—due to this immediate recognition. A
snippet of sound, therefore, is perceived “with the greatest economy of perceptual effort”
(Shklovsky 5). As the recognizable layers of sound tick by, I watch them rise and fall,
meld into each other, and transform. The repetitions and cacophonous layers total an
entirely new sound: an effect which gradually pulls the structural, analytical, and archival
attributes of Oswald’s work out of the experience. The sonic experience extends out from
the structural framework that is at the root of Oswald’s conceptual intentions. The
economy of perceptual effort, therefore, is complicated by Oswald’s compositional,
technical, and aesthetic choices. The sonic ebb and flow, and the transformation of
recognizable material, becomes intoxicating as I listen, as I am perceptually awakened by
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the “obliteration of meaning,” by each passing liberation from the intended narratives of
the original sources (Reynolds 56).
While Oswald has changed the form of his material insofar as he has inserted it
into a new composition, he has more specifically changed its essence. The snippets of
individual sound retain their essential form, even though they are extracted from their
original contexts. Even as my perception of each appropriated snippet changes, it remains
concrete as a discernible part: a puzzle piece in an increasingly complicated
recontextualization. It is rather my association with the parts that has changed: their effect
on my sonic experience, their nature, their essence has changed. And with this change I
perceive them as entirely new sonic bits of information and cultural detritus. The parts
are liberated, in a sense, from the seemingly fixed meanings of their original contexts.
Oswald, in his essay, “Bettered by the Borrower: The Ethics of Musical Debt,”
offers a summary of his intentions:
All popular music is (as is all folk music by definition) essentially, if not legally,
existing in a public domain. Listening to pop music isn’t a matter of choice.
Asked-for or not, we’re bombarded by it. In its most insidious state, filtered to an
incessant bassline, it seeps through apartment walls and out of the heads of
Walkpeople. . . . Difficult to ignore, pointlessly redundant to imitate: how does
one not become a passive recipient? (137)
It is this bombardment, this seeping through walls, which calls for the (tactically) creative
act of enstrangement. Not to replace or reject the incessant, unasked-for bombardment of
popular culture, but to complicate and expand it, to impose new meanings and uses onto
its ubiquitous formulas. The tactic, therefore, is a way out of passive spectatorship, a path
to a negotiated, complicated dialogue, an extension (often literally, as I will address) into
new perceptual orientations of spectacle.
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A Place of Meeting
Spectacle, therefore, if we accept that it is transient—able to be complicated or
enstranged—rather than inherently fixed, describes a state of constant flux between active
and passive reception. It describes a psychological toggle between submission and
criticality, a form of individual or personal negotiation that occurs parallel to a collective
cultural one. The most available material, therefore, might be considered the most fertile
for collective understanding, to relate the individual, psychological human condition to
that of the larger body. Spectacle, in this way, is a collective location, a place of meeting.
The prologue to Don DeLillo’s novel Underworld, titled “The Triumph of Death”
(also published previously as a short story under the title “Pafko at the Wall”),
exemplifies this notion of spectacle as a fertile place of meeting, a location in which the
familiar is enstranged. Like Tolstoy, DeLillo creates fictional and descriptive context
around a specific, ubiquitous, abstracted event: a famous baseball game. The story is an
account, from various perspectives, of a game on October 3, 1951 in which the New York
Giants beat the Brooklyn Dodgers to win the playoffs, thanks to a famous home run
called the “Shot Heard ‘Round the World.” Images of this game became ingrained in the
psyche of America: the ball leaving the bat; Pafko, the outfielder, looking up over the
wall; the crowd pouncing on the ball as it leaves the field (11-60).
By choosing this game, and specifically this moment, as his subject, DeLillo coopts his reader’s own interpretation and memory of this event in order to address the
other events, politics, and emotions that are on the periphery: the noise of the event. The
spectacle, as a culturally accepted fact and collective location, allows him to highlight,
invent, and fictionalize various contexts surrounding the game and complicate the nature
of the moment.
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DeLillo, for instance, describes iconic members of the crowd, such as Frank
Sinatra and J. Edgar Hoover, and gives them fictional internal monologues. (The iconic
characters he chose to depict, he later discovered, were likely actually present at the game
in 1951.) DeLillo, therefore, engages us in a meta-relationship with spectacle in which
iconic characters (perceived with the greatest economy of perceptual effort) are subject to
their own perceptual toggle between critical awareness (dialogical negotiation) and
submissive absorption (pure spectacle) of the game.20 The phenomenon of spectacle is
explored as a human condition in which all sensory experience is at once habituated
abstraction and complicated extension. The spectacle is defamiliarized only to be
refamiliarized; made new by the tactic of enstrangement.
DeLillo used material such as the announcement audio from the game, images
and anecdotal accounts, as well as the front page of the New York Times from the
following day, October 4, 1951, as research for his story. The Times’ competing headline,
alongside that of the game, reads, “Soviet’s second atom blast in 2 years revealed by
U.S., details are kept secret” (“Prologue – The Triumph of Death”). DeLillo, through use
of this peripheral information, taps into a collective unconscious and constructs a
dramatization of an actual event. The noise—the random information, the thoughts of
individuals in the crowd, the interactions of various types of people—is infused into the
experience of spectacle; the random scatter of individual perceptions, interpretations, and
impulses hover around a fixed point of attention. DeLillo, in the final paragraph,
describes a celebrating fan running and jumping on the field after the game:

20

These associative terms (critical awareness, dialogical negotiation, as opposed to submissive absorption,
pure spectacle) have been used previously in this paper in relation to the opacity-transparency binary.
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All the fragments of the afternoon collect around his airborne body. Shouts, batcracks, full bladders and stray yawns, the sand-grain manyness of things that can’t
be counted. It is all falling indelibly into the past. (60)
Through the vague ambiguity of perception and experience, our collective attention
intermittently rests on these spectacles—these airborne bodies, these baseball games,
these ubiquitous cultural forms.
A flip of Shklovsky’s terms, as in Oswald’s pieces, therefore changes the essence
of something without changing its form. This flip carries with it implications of misuse, a
term discussed previously in regards to appropriative, noise-based, and activist tactics.
Although communitarian concerns only subtly underlie these three tactics (at least in the
ways I’ve contextualized them) the true communitarian urge to work with cultural forms
is best summarized in an excerpt from the story “Accounts of a Move.” This short story is
a fictionalized travel log, which acts as a long statement for the artistic practices and
philosophical curiosities of my 20s. The main character, Funes, named for a Jorge Luis
Borges character, embarks on a cross-country trip and considers the psychology of
moving. He grapples with his impending anxiety—“the imperceptible toggle between
anxiety and inspiration”—which is embodied by a cloud of fog that seems to follow and
address him as his trip winds to a close.
The following excerpt depicts the main character reflecting on his own attraction
to, misuse of, and consequent comfort in common cultural forms. Additionally, the
excerpt addresses the dilemma of spectacle: the toggle of perception between criticality
and absorption, and the degrees of alienation and connection such a toggle engenders.
Although the main character’s perspective is alienated at the time of his reflection, he
also seems to understand that collective attention often rests on spectacle, that engaging
and grappling with its formulas might lead to greater cultural dialogue and connectivity.
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The alienation in the company of his childhood friend Bachelard that he recalls, for
instance, is a feeling worth working with, worth exploring and communicating. Funes’s
trip is almost complete as he heads eastward on a train to an ambiguous future:

The next afternoon Funes changes trains in Chicago and begins to head for Washington
D.C., then Hartford the following evening. Time, he realizes, is running out. He sits in the
observation car as the train passes somewhere near Toledo and watches an old, classic
baseball game that is playing on a wall-mounted monitor. The common practice of
watching a television feels somehow comforting to him, and he begins to mentally
deconstruct the imagery. He watches the pitcher, the batter’s expression, the cut to the
nervous manager in the dugout, then back again to the batter, then again to the pitcher.
He watches the shortstop bobble the ball and miss a play, then the instant replay in slow
motion, which painfully describes the mistake, then the cut back to the shortstop, in real
time, anguished, embarrassed, looking up at the sun, down at the dirt, anything to divert
attention. The replay, Funes realizes, is like a filmic memory—a flashback. For a fleeting
moment as the slow motion scene unravels, the viewer is inside the head of the character,
knowing his shame, understanding his psychology. Funes gathers these shots and
separates them, stores them in his memory as he analyzes the dramatic narrative of the
game—the ways in which the camera angles and production decisions weave together the
story, invent the story.
He remembers watching sitcoms with Bachelard when they were young. He
remembers analyzing the details, the lighting, the timing, and the uniformity of the laugh
track. He remembers watching the actors instead of the characters, and the ways in
which this tendency alienated him from Bachelard and their other friends. Funes had
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laughed when he was not supposed to and missed the joke when others laughed. He had
been unable to explain this. He could never articulate this tendency to deconstruct, which
seemed to ruin their shared experience. He had had so much trouble giving himself over
to the situation. He was crippled by the details—by his desire to find the seams, to
understand the mechanisms that acted upon his experience . . .

This passage exemplifies a pivotal point in my creative process. The main character’s
impulse to deconstruct (to replace or reject) is just beginning to transform into an impulse
to enstrange (to extend or repurpose).

From Deconstruction to Enstrangement
The impulse behind my studio work has evolved from deconstruction to enstrangement in
various ways, which I will highlight by analyzing a few recent projects. This evolution
has involved questions about source material, rule-based processes, site-specificity,
collaboration, and the construction of narrative media. It can be summarized as a move
from didactic intentionality to experimental indeterminacy. This is not to say that all
current work is openly indeterminate and the older fixedly intentional because I don’t
think either would be true. Only that I increasingly find my studio practice to be about
asking questions rather than explaining arguments, experimenting versus pointing. I find
myself increasingly an “audience to the results” of my programmatic experiments with
narrative media and cultural forms.
First I will briefly qualify my usage of the term deconstruction. Although it is my
intention to tacitly reference deconstructionism as an established school of thought, my
use of the term is intended to be more literal: an impulse to directly intervene into cultural
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material, to break it apart. This is, in a sense, what Derrida does, in his theory of
deconstruction, to the notion of meaning in that it can be dismantled into a sequence of
signs, each piece a negation of the possibility of a pure presence. But Derrida’s theory, it
seems, is more complicated than that. According to Susan Jahoda, in a lecture on visual
culture, Derrida’s usage,
was an attempt at dismantling the logic behind systems of thought, political
structures and social institutions. He was not seeking to deny the existence of
relative truths and historical continuities but rather to see things as an effect of a
deeper history. He was looking to reveal the unconscious languages of social
institutions and practices.
In Derrida’s looking to reveal can be found an analogue to my usage of enstrangement: a
desire, from the foundational process of deconstructive dismantling, to find a deeper
history; in a sense, an enstranged refamiliarization.
Within the Yale School of Deconstruction, however, “deconstruction was
positioned as invulnerable and unaccountable,” according to Jahoda, “an apolitical
position that emphasized a decontextualized relativity—if all positions are fictional and
relative they must be value free.” It seems, upon greater reflection, that this latter
designation of deconstruction—as apolitical and value-free—is closer to my usage in this
paper, in its differentiation from enstrangement. Jahoda’s criticality of the Yale School’s
usage also serves as a critique of my own within the context of this section: the Yale
School’s arguably nihilistic or cynical impulse to deconstruct versus Derrida’s revelatory
or hopeful one. The evolution in my work that I am referencing acknowledges that the
work has progressed (it is my hope, or maybe aspiration) from deconstruction (the
impulse to dismantle its own self-evident validation) to enstrangement (once dismantled,
made new; imbued with a condition). The former a kind of pointing, the latter a
composing.
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The following analysis of my studio work is considered through the lens of these
terms. The above passage from “Accounts of a Move” is directly related to At the Wall, a
6-channel video, 3-channel audio installation, titled as an homage to Delillo’s story. This
project is a division of a famous baseball game (a fan famously reaching out and stealing
a home run) into shot types. The divisions, each their own unique version, force a nonlinear reading of the game and its climactic events. Replays begin to look like filmic
flashbacks, close-ups like introspective portraits. Ideally designed for public spaces—to
be encountered in a state of liminality—this installation attempts to change the essence of
the culturally ubiquitous imagery without changing its form, while simultaneously
functioning as a critique of spectacle. As Jeffrey, an eleven-year-old fan, reaches over the
wall he instantly transitions from spectator (one of eleven million either present or
watching on television) to object of spectacle. The audio and video versions set the stage
for this transition and accentuate the methods used in the original broadcast to construct
dramatic narrative.
At the Wall, however, remains deconstructionist at its core. Although I would
argue that the recontextualized material might be enstranged in that each version is a new
way of considering the intended narrative, the project remains more knowingly
explanatory than curiously experimental. This is not to directly align enstrangement with
experimentation or indeterminacy, but rather to acknowledge that Shklovsky’s term
requires a degree of unknowing in order to re-know, a complication of the known so that
it might be imbued with new understanding. Thom Andersen’s film, discussed earlier in
this paper, in that it veers from observational description of popular film to moralistic
explanation, might relate to this analysis of At the Wall. Andersen, it seems, is no longer
posing questions to himself or his viewers by the end of the film, but is rather explaining
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(knowing) a specific position. To follow this example, might the act of enstrangement
entail imparting a degree of trust to the viewer? As mentioned earlier, Andersen seems to
have lost trust in his audience by the end of the film: the tone of his voiceover essay more
damning, its juxtaposition with the images less nuanced. In short, I wonder what
questions I was posing to myself in making At the Wall, with what new meaning or
familiarization my subject might have been imbued through my hand. The project might,
therefore, remain on the side of deconstruction. While not directly damning or
pessimistic, it reflects a previously mentioned tendency to find the seams: to diffuse the
trail of intended narrative without attempting to blaze a new one.
Inspired by Harun Farocki’s Deep Play, and various works by Paul Pfeiffer
(namely The Long Count III and The Rules of Basketball series), in addition to Delillo’s
story, At the Wall is a foundational piece in the evolution between deconstruction and
enstrangement. For the sake of this discussion I will place Deep Play on the side of
deconstruction and Pfeiffer’s work on the side of enstrangement. This is by no means a
clean analogy, but rather a tactic to describe the respective powers of didactic versus
experimental tendencies. The power of Farocki’s work, at least to some degree, resides in
his ability as an essayist, researcher, and cultural critic; Pfeiffer’s, in his curiosity as an
artist engaging in craft.
While Deep Play remains comfortably within the realm of art experience and
installation ephemera, it is heavily deconstructionist, as it offers the viewer twelve
perspectives (clean feed camera angles, statistical graphics, the exterior of the stadium) of
a soccer game (the 2006 World Cup final) (“Deep Play”). The linear narrative of the
game is broken into these various ways of understanding the experience: an
organizational action that privileges the complexities of mediation over the specificity of
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constructed meaning. The narrative of the game, therefore, is less important than its
mediation. I would not argue that Farocki’s action is moralistic or didactic, rather only
that it does not seem to pose any particular questions: the acquisition, contextualization,
and presentation of source material (as in, for instance, the methods of a documentarian)
seem far more important than the material’s manipulation, transformation, and
composition. Where Oswald’s Plunderphonics pieces, as discussed previously, extend out
from a place of structured criticality, Deep Play remains within critical knowledge and
awareness of source. Might it be that Farocki’s relationship to material and craft is simply
different—more analytical, less physical—than Oswald’s? The artist’s relationship to
material, therefore, seems an important condition to consider.
I will align Pfeiffer’s work, at least for the sake of this argument, with Oswald’s
and therefore on the side of enstrangement: extending out from what might be a
deconstructionist impulse to engage in a more formally aesthetic relationship with
material. Pfeiffer betrays this deconstructionist foundation in acknowledging that:
There is something seductive about predigested images. . . . There is a huge
infrastructure that undergirds every individual image we see on T.V. For me, it is
very hard to dissociate the single image from that entire network. So the question
always comes up, ‘Who’s using whom?’ Is the image making us, or do we make
images?”
There is an urgency in Pfeiffer’s language, arguably even an activist impulse, as
discussed regarding Oswald’s urge to co-opt the bombardment of pop music. For Pfeiffer,
like Oswald, the ubiquitous presence of cultural forms in the public domain is a call for
insertion. Not simply deconstruction, but rather extension out from deconstruction into
new realms of creative misuse, of enstranged cultural forms. It seems that this extension
requires a certain relationship with the material, a certain transformation of the material’s
essence through some form of technical craft.
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I believe I have challenged the virtues of the discrete art-object exhaustively
enough in this paper for this emphasis on craft not to be confused with art-object
fetishization. It is rather important to emphasize the role that technical craft plays in the
facilitation of dialogue. While technical craft can easily be fetishized, as I have discussed
in relation to the modernist individualist tendencies that still pervade our collective
cultural understanding of art, it is more significantly positioned as a dialogical tool (this
is the shift of emphasis I have discussed in relation to art education). It is this positioning
of craft that has led me to find more experimental, nuanced approaches to my work. It has
begun to lead me, it seems, out from mere deconstruction into the realm of
enstrangement, into a trust with my audience that the work retains a foundation in
structured criticality even as it increasingly transforms, experiments, and indulges in
technical craft.
For Pfeiffer, craft is the process of “building a relationship to the material—
discovering the things that it will do, despite your will, that may end up being more
interesting than what you were trying to will the material to do.” There are implied
questions within Pfeiffer’s practice: unknown results waiting to be discovered. The
critique, therefore, is in the source material, the program, the rule-based process, the
conceptual framework; the critique is in the action itself, thereby freeing the artist to
experiment, indeterminately, formally, even playfully, with the material.
Delillo, Farocki, and Pfeiffer might all be motivated by the seduction of
predigested images, which has led them to the spectacle of sports. It is certainly what has
led me to it: the sheer number of eyes on a single event—a shared experience—seems
validation enough to engage with the material. Amateur storm footage (Watching
Storms), Iraq war protest imagery (Travels in Hypernostalgia), and prescription drug
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advertisements (Sense of Self) also represent engagement with spectacle as a type of
shared experience. While these video and sound installations attempt to make ubiquitous
cultural forms new, like At the Wall, they remain deconstructionist: they complicate their
subjects, but generally leave them in a state of ambiguous diffusion. The attempted
tactics, however, are valiant efforts: composing storm footage into a rhythmic, trance-like
composition; recontextualizing personal videos of protests to consider forms of cultural
nostalgia; isolating and collaging characters and landscapes from drug ads to create new
associations and narratives. But these efforts, it seems, leave too clear a trail back to the
overt intentionality of deconstruction: the artist, if I am to be truly self-critical, has laid
out his plans too neatly from the start, and the results, for the sake of this argument, do
not facilitate dialogue in an articulate way. The viewer, rather, is left with the pieces of
deconstructed material, with, in a sense, defamiliarized, ambiguated cultural form.
A particular attribute of Sense of Self, however, is pivotal to this evolution in my
work from deconstruction to enstrangement that I am describing. The inclination to
extend scenes from prescription drug ads—extract characters, gestures, and expressions
from their instantaneous, almost subliminal original contexts—began, as I worked on the
project, to yield unexpected relationships with the material. Which camera angles worked
and which didn’t? On which type of action could a frame be seamlessly looped and on
which would it become too mechanical? As I worked on this project, the characters
became live actors, each with their own temperaments and nuanced needs, with their own
thresholds for life-like presence. At which point would the character lose his or her
humanity, the device of editing too harsh or visible? This was Pfeiffer’s craft:
experimenting with material more than executing a plan; what the material would do,
despite my will.
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A Reservoir
Composer and jazz musician Anthony Braxton, in his introduction to his Catalog of
Works, writes that structural material and fragmentary form “becomes a reservoir of
structural and conceptual possibilities” (203). This contextualization of one’s method of
artistic production—the building of themes, forms, and versions versus emphasis on
fixed, discrete objects—speaks directly to notions of art as a dialogical tool. Forms,
techniques, and previous compositions, therefore, may be drawn from the artist’s
reservoir to be applied and engaged in new ways.
A newfound impulse to experiment with cultural forms rather than merely
deconstruct them has led to the Fugues. This ongoing series of short videos has become a
meditation on time, narrative expectation, and technical craft. It is a repository for various
inclinations—a frame through which to indulge, resolve, and compile quickly passing
impulses with time-based material. The videos are, therefore, both finished thoughts, as
well as recyclable pieces of a larger puzzle. I think of them as self-contained,
distributable gems, built on the back of the previous multi-channel installation work that
might prove to be unsustainable—impractical—in the future, if my practice is truly
intended serve a dialogical purpose. I am more interested now in gathering—in building
the reservoir—so that each passing impulse, having been given form, may be called upon
to inform, support, and contextualize new and ever-evolving versions of my ongoing
engagement with media culture.
The binary of versions versus fixed products relates to various topics addressed
previously in this paper. The notion of form as part of a reservoir relates to discussions of
media archaeology: the impulse, given a form, becomes a type of indexical artifact that
75

may be recontextualized. It relates to tactics of appropriation as repurposing form:
allowing form and its intended meaning to be transient. It relates to the notion of art as an
action: the active positioning of form versus object revery. There is a kind of selfcuration implied here, a kind of self-appropriation. To emphasize versions is to accept
some degree of indeterminacy: to offer one’s forms to the greater collective catalogue.
Form, in this way, is a translatable, recontextualizable dialogical tool.
Christian Marclay’s Record Without a Cover comes to mind. An album of his live
DJ sets, the record came with no jacket or cover; only instructions that read, “do not store
in a protective package.” By allowing each copy of the record to by smudged, scratched,
and warped in unrepeatable ways, Marclay facilitated various versions of a single form,
“not a document of a performance,” he says, “but a record that could change with time”
(Young).
While Record Without a Cover is a singular conceptual gesture, and therefore
arguably a fixed product in its own right, the Fugues are designed to be open-ended
versions of various conceptual impulses, which may be executed and resolved in different
ways using different materials. (I will address these open-ended intentions in relation to
education in the concluding section titled “Application”). Here are a few examples of the
impulses that inform the Fugues.
Fugue #6, the only exception to the short length of the video series, is a 40-minute
piece that uses a rule-based tactic. The structure stems from interest in John Zorn’s Game
Pieces, in which musicians make free decisions based on a series of coded signals
administered by Zorn. While my video is not a live, unrepeatable version, it relates to
Zorn’s pieces in that the programmatic apparatus behind the action is not visible to the
viewer; like Zorn’s pieces, the audience does not have immediate access to the structure,
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but rather simply experiences the results. The video takes one continuous shot (butterflies
flying in a sanctuary), cuts it, and repeats the shot from the beginning for each sequential
cut in an episode of Survivor, the American reality TV program. Because the editing in
these kinds of programs is so rapid (no shot rests on screen for longer than about 10
seconds), the shot of the butterflies never progresses very far.
While the structure for this video stems from Zorn’s pieces, the concept stems
from interest in the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation’s slow TV programs. A 7-hour
train trip, a 5-day boat ride, 8-hours of a live fireplace, 12-hours of live knitting—like a
Warholian slow movie, taken up by the masses and receiving wide Norwegian
viewership. The juxtaposition of two cultural versions of reality television, both
remarkably popular, is too tempting to pass up. The extended shot of the butterflies is
continuously frustrated by seemingly random cuts, which are dictated by the production
of the American reality television show. Fugue #6, carried out for the 40-minute duration
of Survivor, becomes both a viscerally droning, strangely mesmerizing aesthetic image,
as well as a critique of the psychologically jarring production tactic of quick cuts.
Fugue #4 (1-2-3-4, 2-3-4-5) is a response to the experimental music compositions
of Frederic Rzewski and Steve Reich. Rzewski’s Les Moutons de Panurge is a musical
score that is dictated by an algorithm: musicians are asked to follow a sequence of notes
as best they can for as long as they can, the composition accounting for their gradual
falling out of synch and resulting in a unique diffusion of sound. Reich’s phase pattern
technique—gradually shifting synched audio material to create abstracted versions—is a
similar search for an indeterminate sonic result: an experimental search for what the
material will do based on a simple structure. Fugue #4 imposes an algorithmic structure
onto a small piece of appropriated footage—a blurry, full-frame shot of a distant cheering
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crowd. Following a simple step process, the image gradually, mechanically progresses:
four frames forward, three frames back, then four frames forward, three frames back; a
programmatic imposition allowed to play out.
Fugue #7 (Sky Sports) is a simple gesture imposed onto a broadcast of a golf
tournament. It is a systematic extraction and compilation of every shot of the sky the
camera captures as it tracks a ball driven into the air. The cuts are made just after the shot
tilts up beyond the trees and just before it tilts back down onto the course. Edited
sequentially and without break, the motion of the tilt shot gradually seems to rest on the
endlessly soaring golf ball, the viewer’s perception given no visual reference but the sky,
clouds, and ball. The result is both viscerally aesthetic and conceptually rich, as I grow to
appreciate the constant, repetitive work of the broadcast production team, and the tedious
difficulty of centering a shot on the tiny white ball soaring through the sky. In what other
context could we find such a shot, its extraction from context yielding such a strange and
unique image?
Fugue #1 (Furniture Music), #11 ([Dis]continuity), and the newest project, One
Day’s Dialogue, relate more directly to narrative construction. These pieces consider
tactics of linear media, such as establishment shots, cross-cutting, and continuity of
action, in ways that attempt to both complicate structural expectations, as well as imbue
them with new associations. #1, for instance, employs two separate conceptions of time,
cut between each other to create a dissociative viewing experience. Three kayakers enter
a seascape image from the left and eventually exit on the right, their progression across
the frame, however, disrupted by establishment shots that describe the interior of an
ocean-front home. Each time the image of the kayakers returns, their progression picks
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up from where it left off, disregarding the duration of the establishment shots in between:
an appropriation of, and then break from, traditional narrative formula.

Extension
The evolution of my studio work from deconstruction to enstrangement, notions of the
work as an ongoing reservoir, and the particular narrative impulses of the Fugues all
involve some kind of consideration of time, not only as a necessary formal element of the
material, but also as a perceptual and psychological concern. The Norwegian
Broadcasting Corporation found popular appeal in single subjects, often static shots, over
hours, even days, of time. What happens to our expectations of linear information when
we stay with it, when it is extended, when we are immersed in it? In regards to sonic
experiences, what are the virtues of minimal or drone compositions versus narrative or
climactic ones? How might time simultaneously function as formal element and subject
of concern?
All the Time in the World is an attempt at this latter question regarding
simultaneity. This project is a feature-length remixed version of George Pal’s 1960 film,
The Time Machine, based on the 1895 dystopian novel by H.G. Wells. Screen split into
two channels, the left is a reverse edit of the film (last shot first, first shot last) and the
right is the original cut. Audio is a mix of the two soundtracks, creating serendipitous
syncs and convoluted dissonance as the linear narrative cycles back into itself. A story
about time travel, All the Time in the World is concerned with the construction of the
filmic narrative and the ways in which my intervention might complicate the viewer’s
perception of narrative progress. Viewers, in a sense, must time travel along with the
main character, holding scenes, dialogues, and events in their heads in order to maintain a
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degree of continuity. What results are seemingly random juxtapositions of images and
sounds from the film, which place both the main character and the viewer in a state of
constant subjectivity—the only notably climactic moment occurring at the exact middle
of the film when the reverse edit and the original cut arrive at the same shot. For this
fleeting moment in time, All the Time in the World maintains a sense of narrative order,
otherwise diffused into a viewing experience that is more static than progressive.
While All the Time in the World was an arduous labor to make, which has resulted
in my feeling strangely sentimental about it, to follow the discussion of the last section, it
remains more deconstruction than enstrangement. Although the programmatic structure
yielded indeterminate results, the conceptual impact of the work was still, arguably, a
foregone conclusion; the finished work, as I mentioned regarding At the Wall, might
amount to little more than defamiliarized, ambiguated cultural form. That the labor of
making has led to a kind of sentimentality is born out of a relationship with the material,
an appreciation for well-crafted construction and the arduous work of popular film
editors, for whom the illusion of narrative seamlessness is imperative and integral to their
success. The viewer must get lost in the narrative, as true in popular film as in
prescription drug ads and baseball games. There is a kind of tyranny in the intended
narrative, an insistence upon its own progression. It was through these deconstructed
pieces that I began to truly appreciate how advanced the mechanisms of meaning are—
how transparent the medium can become, how crystallized the narrative can seem.
This newfound appreciation (and respect) for craft led me to consider other
depictions of time through narrative, time-based media. The following is a brief critical
analysis of Chris Marker’s 1962 film, La Jetée, inserted here in order to contextualize the
precarity of perception in time-based media, particularly in relation to time as both
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subject and form; a precarity that is very different from that which tactics of
deconstruction might engender. By embracing linear narrative form, rather than diffusing
it, Marker is able to provoke a more complicated perception of time, a perception that is
made new—enstranged—by respecting, co-opting, and employing linear narrative tactics.

As I watched Chris Marker’s La Jetée, alone at home late at night while my wife worked
and my daughter slept, I felt transported, like the main character, in a way that mystified
my familiar surroundings. On my familiar couch in my familiar living room—a muslin
scarf draped over the lamp to dim the light—I hesitated to lift my head from the screen,
maybe for subconscious fear of seeing these familiar things differently, of seeing them
abstracted, transformed, or simply complicated.
I tend to become entirely absorbed when a filmmaker attempts to address the
topic of time, as moving picture is both a logical and impossible medium with which to
explore its complexity. Narrative film already plays so heavily on viewers’ memory—
their ability to draw progressive relationships between the images shown—that when a
filmmaker exploits, accentuates, or breaks the filmic formula the viewing experience is
set off kilter. The resulting film, if effective, both is transportive (in the internal sense) as
well as being about transportation through time (in the narrative and external sense). I
resisted glancing up at my familiar room because I was being transported by Marker's
film—concerned, maybe, that the room would be changed, or missing altogether.
There are a number of tactics Marker uses to facilitate this visceral feeling. One
that comes to mind is the image of the experimenter: a knowing, ominous face that leans
over my first-person perspective—the main character’s viewpoint looking up from what
is established as his real-time predicament—the strange hammock bed in the
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experimentation room. The cuts to this face are startling, even when one comes to expect
them, as they lurch the viewer out of the comfortable third-person views of the sweet,
idyllic past.
The topic of time travel has been expressed and experimented with through so
many different stories, films, techniques and strategies—it is an old problem with no
clear answer. But consistent with all, it seems, is the necessity to complicate something
that is familiar or expected. Without such a reference the viewer would be lost in a kind
of untethered abstraction, able to divorce the emotion or meaning from his or her own
experience, which would render the consequence of time travel irrelevant. Maybe this is
what draws us to dreams, memories, the subconscious, or science-fiction: that through
expressive forms we are asked—or rather moved—to consider and re-consider the
familiar, the mundane, and the simultaneous magnitude and triviality of the everyday,
that we learn to become more cognizant of the things we take for granted and moments in
which we lose ourselves.
From a technical standpoint, I found myself wondering about the nature of
Marker’s still images. Considering such a small number of frames would come to express
an entire narrative, my first thought was that each would be more iconic, packed and
cleanly structured. But while the images were extremely purposeful, their compositions
more closely resembled snapshots, like Robert Frank compositions (The Americans
having been released in France four years earlier). The tense urgency of Marker’s
framing strongly supported the tone of the film and encouraged a feeling of candid
unease, as opposed to theatrical remove. This unease was complemented by the cryptic
voice of the narrator, whose tone toggled between removedly explanatory and
expressively illustrative. The sound of raised whispers, for instance—the experimenters
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conferring as the main character emerges from delusion—particularly when experienced
through headphones, made my hair stand on end.

While Marker employs linear narrative tactics to tell his story, others disrupt by
extending it. What happens to our expectations of linear information when it is extended?
Douglas Gordon’s 24 Hour Psycho comes to mind: the arduous extension of an iconic
film to the point at which its climactic narrative is diffused by simply drawing it out; by
offering it as ubiquitous culture form rendered almost static. Shots in which Hitchcock
has already rested our gaze—the long, slow zoom out from the woman’s eye at the end of
the famous shower scene, for instance—may as well, through Gordon’s hand, be still
images.
This notion of extending cultural form is brought to a more refined resolution by
Leif Inge in his sound piece, 9 Beet Stretch. Beethoven’s 9th Symphony extended to 24
hours long, the piece is billed less as a conceptual program, more as a visceral sonic
experience. Although I have never experienced Inge’s piece, and am therefore
referencing it in a way he might dislike, I am captivated by the technical and aesthetic
attention he has brought to the concept. Beethoven’s symphony is stretched, according to
Inge, “with no pitch distortions.” He continues, in an interview at AV Festival 12:
In technical terms, 9 Beet Stretch is not stretched, it is granulation, which means
that it is cut in very, very small segments, overlapping just a tiny little bit, and
then reassembled. This is why the pitch is kept, because it is never changed. . . .
This is also why you hear the instrumentation so perfectly clear.
Duration, Inge goes on to insist, is all that has changed, thanks to the sensitivity of this
granulation process. “Just by changing the measure of time,” Inge states, “you change
things so radically.” Even the listener changes: “It slows thinking; it slows attention to
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things around you.” While honoring the timelessness of Beethoven’s work, Inge is also
disrupting the expectations and effects of linear narrative structure, of the climactic,
spectatorial ebb and flow of the original piece. Inge, therefore, is folding the cultural
form back into the fray, absorbing it into the noisy subjectivity of perception, and making
it new. Though some semblance of form—as in duration—has changed, it is truly the
essence of Beethoven’s piece that has changed, continuing to follow this flip of
Shklovsky’s terms, it has truly been enstranged.
Inge’s contribution to the notion of extension leads to concerns regarding the
virtues of minimal or drone compositions versus narrative or climactic ones. Why must
narrative structure be called into question; what is its detriment? This question is
considered throughout this paper, in relation to, for instance, spectatorial submission and
noise-based tactics. Shklovsky’s notion of our senses being dulled by abstractions that
employ the greatest economy of perceptual effort relates directly to the seamless formulas
of narrative structure, the beckoning of narrative media to become absorbed in its
content. Narrative structure is not inherently detrimental. I am employing narrative
formula as I structure this very paper. It is more an issue of quantity, in a sense, than
quality. It is more the issue of Oswald’s bombardment than any notion that narrative
structure is detrimental, en masse. Maybe it is more the incessance—the constant
confrontation with intended meanings in our culture—that begins to feel like a kind of
tyranny.
To return briefly to the topic of sound, consider the minimalist composer Tony
Conrad’s criticism of narrative progression in Western music, in relation to the ways in
which he was influenced by Indian musical traditions:
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Western music, with its ever-present investment in progression, animates a sense
of absence—of suspension or expectation. This irresolution corresponds to the
conflict that provides a forward impetus in narrative story telling. Indian music
also conveys feelings of suspension and resolution, but much differently—and
always in the presence of its object. Its operative figure is balance, or repetition,
but not absence and conflict. (314)
By characterizing narrative structure as animating a sense of absence, Conrad is speaking
directly to this tyranny. It is in the absence and conflict of intended narrative that we
become absorbed, in which we find an enticing avenue of psychological escape. Every
instantaneous absorption of intended narrative, for the sake of this extreme argument, is a
submissive choice; an acquiescence to the imposed progression. The drone, it seems, is a
more open-ended form, a venue in which one is more easily in control of one’s own sense
of awareness—of one’s own toggle between absorption and criticality. The intended
narrative, so intriguingly seductive, might be too exhausting a force to resist, and so we
succumb.
Narrative, in this way, is a kind of giving up on awareness. This is the extremity
of the argument, but it is also an indulgence I succumb to all the time. As I have
characterized, this succumbing is a choice. In a culture of narrative forms and intended
meanings, it is a constant choice to either write your own story for your awareness, or
embrace those of others. The choice is not, therefore, to reject intended narratives for the
sake of minimalist, non-linear, or non-spectatorial forms of expression, but rather to
extend out from a basic understanding of—negotiation with—narrative formulas. Like
my character of Funes in “Accounts of a Move,” there are times in which I cannot
maintain continuity within an intended narrative, when the insistence of the structure is
too imposing, the mechanisms too visible. In times like these I feel almost incapable of
thought—incapable of holding the dictates, subtleties, and reasoning of the story in my
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mind—because “to think is to forget a difference, to generalize, to abstract.” This
preoccupation with the details, if only on occasion, must be relieved through engagement
with the non-linear, the indeterminate, the unexpected, the complicated, the enstranged.
My mind, in these moments, seems to be calling for quiet—fewer details to manage, no
expectations to be thwarted or satisfied, smaller hills to navigate across the open expanse
of time.
And at the same time, these occasional moments of discord are opportunities for
misuse, opportunities to serve the cultural need (the job, perhaps) to smooth out the edges
of Shklovsky’s habituated perception and complicate the familiar. While enstrangement,
as I have mentioned, increasingly summarizes the methods of my studio practice, it is this
tyranny of intended narrative that summarizes its content. The moving image, and the
devices that make it possible, has evolved parallel to our culture, both sides inventing
new ways to construct narrative, compartmentalize time, and establish standards. It
remains the most fertile, visceral, and accessible medium of expression for our culture.
The persuasive force of narrative structure—its mechanisms, negotiations, and
psychological underpinnings—is, for me, endlessly captivating fodder for a sustained
studio practice, and a career in media arts and education.
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CHAPTER 5
APPLICATION

Introduction
How does this all apply to a career in the arts, to a lifelong studio practice? Where does
the work live out in the world; how might it function as a dialogical tool? For whom is
the practice sustained and in what venues or forms? I would like to address some of these
concerns in this concluding section, and I will begin with a logical topic: this paper itself.
This paper is broken up into sections on personal and historical reflection,
methodology, the content of the work, and prospective applications for my practice. It is
structured in this way in an attempt to begin a holistic framework for the ways in which
visual art, media studies, and forms of social practice might intermingle within a
thorough curriculum. I am interested in using this paper as a basis from which to build
various versions, essays, and prompts to suit the needs of various kinds of institutions,
schools, and levels of instruction. From broad theoretical analysis to the specificity of
technical exercises and prompts, this document might serve as a foundation for my
commitment to education. Each section, therefore, might be distilled into presentations
for high school artists, programmatic proposals, Web-based portals, or event-based
installations. This paper has become a roadmap for me, a place to organize the various
concerns and influences that drive my career, as well as a place to be self-critical. It has
challenged me to call my own creative impulses into question and hold them up to the
same applicable, dialogical, conscientious standards with which I hold my teaching
practice. It has, in a sense, brought all practices to the line and attempted to funnel them
all through the same pedagogical framework. The paper, in this way, has been an attempt
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to carve a niche out of the dense forest of cultural images and forms, as well as that of
academia. It has been an attempt to find a position.
I can’t say for certain that I have found this position. I will still conclude this
paper and thesis exhibition without a direct application for the work I have done and will
continue to do. This is, of course, both exciting and nerve-wracking.

The Waiting Room
The Waiting Room, the title of my thesis exhibition, is another place to consider the
application of my work. Situated on the ground floor of the Eastworks building,
Easthampton, MA, this show is an attempt to embody the tenuous straddle position of my
work that I have discussed throughout this paper: the constant toggle between absorption
and repulsion, submission and criticality, passivity and activity in the realm of cultural
forms, spectacles, and contexts. The work, therefore, both is and is about this toggle, an
attempt to embody the tension of cultural participation.
The situation of The Waiting Room, directly off of a main public lobby and across
from the Massachusetts RMV, is an ideal location to enact this toggle. Not quite a
waiting room, not quite an exhibition, it is an attempt to find the interim space between.
Each individual work, therefore, draws, to varying degrees, relationships with other kinds
of public viewing: banner displays, screens in sports bars and airports, gallery
installations, abstract prints in doctor’s offices, for example. Contextual information for
these works is not present alongside the object in order to engage the viewer more
directly, as one would encounter any number of other forms of cultural stimuli in public
places. This information is still available in booklet form, only not immediately imposing
itself on the initial encounter. My intention is that the situation of The Waiting Room will
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attract various types of viewers, those who are interested in art and those who are not, but
that most will be, through the circumstances of their presence in this business-like public
setting, in some state of liminality—some state of waiting. This state of liminality—this
captive, pregnant openness, between states of intentional progress; between one’s request
for a new license and its eventual issuing, for instance—is ripe for the device of
enstrangement, for engagement in newfound negotiated meanings of ubiquitous cultural
forms.
While this hope for engagement—for negotiation—might occur psychologically,
individually, and privately within each user of The Waiting Room, I also hope for the
work to serve a directly dialogical, potentially even indeterminate, function. Included
with each information booklet (titled The Waiting Room User’s Manual) is also a set of
prompts: variously loose, poetic, technical, and specific prospective exercises that offer a
non-traditional context for the individual work.21 Rather than use the information booklet
as a place to explain, dictate, or prescribe specific ways to interpret and contextualize the
work (pointing backward), it is used to offer ways in which the user might produce new
versions of the basic concept (looking forward). The User’s Manual, therefore, is an
offering: a way in which to consider the discrete art object as a transient version of a
creative impulse—a particular act—rather than a fixed, immovable product. The prompts
are ways to facilitate dialogue, to place my particular art action into the realm of
negotiated meaning. It is also, in a sense, the first adapted version of this paper, as the
prompts will no doubt double in the coming years as assignments for high school media
artists.

21

The idea for The Waiting Room User’s Manual is inspired by Philip Perkis’s experimental book of
assignments, titled, Teaching Photography: Notes Assembled, see Perkis.
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PlayLaborPlay
The installation of The Waiting Room employs tactics used in constructing the
collaborative, event-based practice, PlayLaborPlay. These one-night events have
increasingly become reactions to site-specific conditions: fewer and fewer shows have
emerged from this practice that require neutral, gallery-type conditions. The events we
have pursued and constructed, rather, have found success in responding to the needs of
the venue, the architecture, the past-life of the space. PlayLaborPlay has increasingly
become a project of insertion, a placement of a creative condition onto the space’s
character, a negotiation between space and intervention. This was the opportunity I found
in inserting my studio work into such a public, transient space: I have gradually found
that I am serving the needs of the unique event more than the display of objects, and this
has been an exciting development. Exciting because PlayLaborPlay increasingly satisfies
a holistic wealth of my creative concerns and motivations. Not all motivations, certainly,
but most. It is, therefore, the ongoing artistic structure to which I am most committed as I
move forward in my career. I think it is because of the endless possibilities that it offers;
the lifelong practice of collaboration, negotiation, and compromise is of ever-present
value to the intellectual, expressive, and communicative health of the individual.
This judgement, I believe, is peppered throughout this paper, but what is not yet
fully addressed is the potential economic value—the economic reality—of an event-based
project like PlayLaborPlay. While I am committed to a career in some form of education,
I am not yet committed to one institution, or even the idea of finding one. My
involvement in structure, pedagogy, curriculum development, and programmatic design
betray a quiet desire to build my own organization. This organization could run
90

workshops, facilitate discussions and presentations, host site-specific events, act as a
production house, and generally become a central location for the confluence of
production, media education, and event design. Again, this paper might prove to be a
valuable foundation for this goal. What continues to rise to the surface of my career
motivations is the confluence of studio practice, teaching, and event-based design; the
ways in which these three elements intermingle, merge, and potentially even evolve into
a single practice. The Waiting Room is beginning to address this evolution: installation
choices made in the manner of PlayLaborPlay, the display and juxtaposition of works as
representative of my studio practice, and The User’s Manual a direct application as a
dialogical (teaching) tool. I am interested in the potential for a structured organization to
encompass, and be the framework for, this evolution.
How might this happen? I still don’t know. Membership models seem strenuous
to maintain, and one must give up a certain degree of autonomy as well. While
PlayLaborPlay celebrates collaboration in the form of discrete projects, such collectivism
might water down the pedagogical mission of the prospective organization. It is also
unclear what members would receive for their contributions, other than community,
which they could no doubt find for free in their neighborhoods, creative circles, and daily
lives.
The non-profit model is enticing, but seems also to be a constant struggle for
survival, as grant writers must search incessantly for the next funding stream. A more
practical approach is to find an existing organization to pitch a program to. This method
just requires that one exists, is local, and is viable enough to absorb a new program.
Another option would be to provide a marketable service, such as tuition-based
workshops or distributable products. While seeming to be common and accessible
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enough, this option comes with all the trappings of the consumer-based model, dictated
by supply and demand. It is of course nice to think that my services might be demanded,
but the rat-race of true economic viability within this system would be difficult to sustain.
As happens, the most sellable products of the organization would need to be prioritized
for the sake of sustainability, which might conflict with the prospective mission of the
organization as a confluence of various practices. It seems that some organizations like
this find ways to survive by selling coffee or other small, tangential products, but this
revenue stream often must be supplemented with others.
Organizations like Creative Capital might present the opportunity to receive
funding in the form of a granted award. This organization accepts proposals and selects
artists to help on the way to sustainability. Such a program might be a way to navigate the
above possibilities with regards to the most suitable model, in that their approach is
inspired by venture-capital principles.
Whether a collective, a non-profit entity, or a for-profit enterprise, it still seems
best to err on the side of need, to investigate what a constituency might need and how it
might be served. As I have described in sections on education, there truly seems to be a
need, at basic levels of art instruction, to align the cultural functions of the artist with the
ways in which the artist is nurtured. If artists are increasingly entrepreneurs, operating
within a system that asks them to be flexible and adaptable, while maintaining high levels
of specialized technical craft, then we should be shifting our curricular structures to
follow suit. The most immediate and attainable application for my work, therefore, is in
the schools, where I am asked to adapt my program to the unique needs of the institution.
This paper, my body of work, my archive of past events, my syllabi, therefore, all amount
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to a singular modus operandi. Inserting this M.O. into various applications is a delicate
craft, perhaps the most valuable service I can offer a constituency.

Credentials, Vocations, and Communities
There are problems with this logic, of course. Alison Gerber, in a presentation of her
sociological doctorate work on the economics of art, would call my above justification
credentialing: the maintenance of a studio practice for the sake of keeping professional
credit within academia. While I am not so cynical in my true motivations (art-making, as
I have characterized, is a timeless language), I understand the sentiment here: that a
studio practice, if not directly participating in the market, becomes a precarious,
ambiguous affair. What, then, motivates it? Gerber offers many suggestions, two of
which I will emphasize: vocationalism and communitarianism.
Vocationalism, according to Gerber, is driven by a kind of high purpose in art, a
pursuit for which market validation is a trivial concern. These artists, Gerber suggests, are
committed to this high purpose and the freedoms—as opposed to the market’s
strictures—it facilitates. “Market work,” Gerber states in regards to this vocational
perspective:
often disallows the integrity and autonomy that artistic practice encourages,
market work is incompatible with the artist’s self identity, and market work,
because it is beholden to forces that are alien to artists and their surroundings,
disallows the specificity and depth of accomplishment that is possible in artistic
practice.
This last statement regarding specificity and depth speaks directly to the hurdles I
sometimes foresee in my career. How do we justify artistic behavior—often idiosyncratic
without serving any immediate function—when no one is directly requesting it? There is
a kind of faith at work here, a gut feeling that the task must be carried out. This seems to
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get at the core of artistic expression: if I don’t follow my impulse and carry out my idea
or resolve my video project, no one else will. That particular singular version of our
collective cultural construct, as I have mentioned, would be lost forever: a potential
artifact, withheld from the index of history. This is not to say, with grandiosity, that
history needs my unique artifact, only that the prospect of withholding it is a bleak vision.
These concerns, it seems, are quintessentially vocational.
Gerber’s second designation, which describes artistic motivation outside of the
market, is communitarianism. “Artists work to create community,” Gerber states:
because they build the community they want feedback from. In many cases, that
type of community doesn’t exist before artists conjure it. Through investments in
their own artistic practice, they feed forward to build the community from which
they hope for feedback.
Vocational artists, it seems, must build a community that supports—emotionally, if not
economically—the idiosyncratic specificity of their artistic practice, to create an audience
to receive, critique, enjoy, and discuss the various artistic gestures that are so important to
sustain. This impulse, again, sounds like a kind of cultural offering, a singular response to
the human condition. It is the community, then, that nurtures these offerings: a kind of
concept-development sharing, formalized as manifestos, organizational structures, and
artworks, not necessarily authorless, but certainly not individualist either.
This communitarian impulse is directly related to PlayLaborPlay and its
motivation to create venues for active dialogue, to create places of meeting. Part of the
appeal of these events, it seems, is the ephemeral quality—the resistance of object revery.
Rather it is always the object’s orientation—its place within a greater context—that is of
value. PlayLaborPlay events are not art opening, theatrical performances, or parties, but
rather something in between: the fleeting nature of the one-night event, the meeting in an
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unlikely place, the negotiation between construction and happenstance, the slippery space
between ownership and collaboration—these are the elements that seem captivating. A
PlayLaborPlay event is simply a place to be, a place to engage with the fruits of a
constantly vacillating artist community. No past event could have happened without the
long, inspiring process of dialogical negotiation.

A Place to Be
But still, given Gerber’s powerful analyses, I am faced with the brass tacks of my next
move: teaching photography and media arts to high school students. Given the wealth of
complication and academic insight I have absorbed through discussions, critiques,
arguments, research, experimentations, and collaborations in the past three years, I am
inspired to rethink high school level curriculum and programmatic structure. While I
don’t see a clear answer to the changing role of the artist in society, I have gained a better
understanding of the complexity of the question through work like Gerber’s, as well as
through research into the concerns of social practice. The potential opportunities that
Deresiewicz’s entrepreneurial designation might yield in the coming decades are exciting
to consider, a sort of new frontier of the artist’s societal role. As I move on to future
endeavors I hope to make productive, programmatic, and pedagogical contributions to
this evolution.
The decision to pursue an MFA degree, at least subconsciously, was certainly a
credentialing choice. It might also have stemmed from trust in professionalism, albeit a
thing of the past in regards to Deresiewicz’s analysis. But, aside from its increasingly
precarious professional value, its pursuit has enormously expanded my understanding of
the state of art, academia, and the artist’s role in the historical and cultural landscape. It
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has refined my studio work and encouraged me to consider my variously scattered
practices through the lens of a more holistic, integrated creative motivation: a way to be
in the world, as an artist, teacher, and organizer. I do not, after all of these pages, have the
answers to my own placement within the art historical context, but I can say with
certainty that I am honored to share the floor with all of those with whom I have worked:
with whom I have navigated this indeterminate, inspiring, often treacherous, often
enlightening state of interim.
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